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How can climate cHange and tHe development of bioenergy  
alter tHe long-term outlook for food and agriculture?
Günther Fischer1
Accumulating scientific evidence has alerted international and national 
awareness to the urgent need to mitigate climate change. Meanwhile, increasing 
and reoccurring extreme weather events devastate more and more harvests and 
livelihoods around the world.
Biofuels development has recently received increased attention as a means 
to mitigate climate change, alleviate global energy concerns and foster rural 
development. Its perceived importance in these three areas has made biofuels 
feature prominently on the international agenda. Nevertheless, the rapid growth of 
biofuel production has raised many concerns among experts worldwide, particularly 
regarding sustainability issues and the threat posed to food security (FAO, 2008a).
As recent events have shown, a number of factors – including the adoption 
of mandatory biofuel policies, high crude oil prices, increasing global food import 
demand, below average harvests in some countries and low levels of world food 
stocks – have resulted in sudden and substantial increases in world food prices. 
The consequences have been food riots around the world, from Mexico and Haiti 
to Mauritania, Egypt and Bangladesh. Estimates indicate that high food prices 
increased the number of food-insecure people by about 100 million.
This chapter presents an integrated agro-ecological and socio-economic 
spatial global assessment of the interlinkages among emerging biofuel 
developments, food security and climate change. Its purpose is to quantify the 
extent to which climate change and expansion of biofuel production may alter the 
long-term outlook for food, agriculture and resource availability, based on work 
1. The work summarized in this chapter uses the modelling tools and databases developed by the 
Land Use Change and Agriculture Programme at IIASA. In particular, the chapter benefited from 
the model and data development and analysis carried out in the frame of a major global study 
on biofuels and food security (Fischer et al., 2009), commissioned by the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Fund for International Development (OFID). The author is 
grateful to colleagues Sylvia Prieler, Eva Hizsnyik, Mahendra Shah and Harrij van Velthuizen for 
their contributions and comments.
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by FAO in its World agriculture towards 2030/2050 assessment (Chapters 1 and 
6 in this volume; FAO, 2006).
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) has 
developed a modelling framework and models to analyse the world food and 
agriculture system spatially and to evaluate the impacts and implications of 
agricultural policies. The modelling framework has recently been extended 
and adapted to incorporate biofuel development issues. A brief summary of the 
methods and models applied in this study is presented in the following section.
Methodology and data
The modelling framework
The analysis is based on a state-of-the-art ecological-economic modelling 
approach. The quantified findings of the scenario-based study rely on a modelling 
framework that includes the FAO/IIASA Agro-Ecological Zone (AEZ) model 
and the IIASA World Food System (WFS) model. The modelling framework 
encompasses climate scenarios, agro-ecological zoning information, demographic 
and socio-economic drivers, and production, consumption and world food trade 
dynamics (Fischer et al., 2009; 2005). A summary of the main model components 
is provided in Annex 3.1.
This modelling framework comprises six main elements, as shown in Figure 3.1:
• A storyline and quantified development scenario is selected (usually from the 
extensive integrated assessment literature) to inform the WFS model about 
demographic changes in each region and projected economic growth in non-
agricultural sectors. It also provides assumptions broadly characterizing the 
international setting (e.g., trade liberalization, international migration) and 
the priorities for technological progress. It quantifies selected environmental 
variables, such as greenhouse gas emissions and atmospheric concentrations 
of carbon dioxide (CO2). In this study, it also defines scenarios of demand 
for first- and second-generation biofuels. 
• The emissions pathway associated with the chosen development scenario 
is used to select from among the available matching published outputs 
from simulation experiments with general circulation models (GCMs). The 
climate change signals derived from the GCM results are combined with 
the observed reference climate to define future climate scenarios.
• The AEZ method is based on a selected climate scenario, estimates the 
likely agronomic impacts of climate change using a spatial grid of 5′ by 5′ 
latitude/longitude, and identifies adaptation options.
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• Estimated spatial climate change impacts on yields of all crops are 
aggregated and incorporated into the parameterization of the national crop 
production modules of a regionalized WFS model.
• The global general equilibrium WFS model – informed by the development 
storyline and estimated climate change yield impacts – is used to evaluate 
internally consistent WFS scenarios.
In a final step, the results of the world food system simulations are downscaled 
to the resource database’s spatial grid for quantification of land cover changes and 
further analysis of the environmental implications of biofuel feedstock production.
figure 3.1
framework for ecological-economic world food system analysis    
Source: Author.
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Potential impacts on the production, consumption and trade of agricultural 
commodities resulting from climate change and/or a rapid expansion of global 
biofuel use were evaluated in two steps. First, simulations were developed to 
represent possible futures where biofuel production was abandoned or frozen 
at current levels (i.e., as in 2008) and kept constant throughout the simulation 
period. Second, climate change impacts and alternative levels of biofuel demand, 
derived from different energy scenarios, were simulated with the WFS model 
and compared with the respective outcomes without additional biofuel demand 
or climate change.
The primary role of a reference scenario is to provide a neutral point of 
departure from which various scenarios take off as variants, with the impact of 
climate change and/or biofuel expansion being defined by the deviation of the 
simulation run from the outcomes of the reference scenario. The simulations were 
carried out yearly for 1990 to 2080.
Baseline assessment
Before turning to the impacts simulated for different assumptions regarding 
biofuel expansion and climate change, this section summarizes the results from a 
baseline projection. For this neutral point of departure, the FAO-REF-00 scenario2  
was selected, which assumes a system where no agricultural crops are used as 
feedstock for biofuel production and where current climate conditions prevail.
Population increase and economic growth
In the long run, the increase in demand for agricultural products is largely driven 
by population and economic growth, especially in developing countries. Over the 
next two decades, world population growth is projected at about 1 percent a year, 
with most of the increase being in developing countries. Population increase is 
an exogenous input in the model analysis. The most recent United Nations (UN) 
population projections available (UN, 2009), summarized in Table 3.1, were used. 
Details of regional groupings in the WFS model are shown in Annex 3.2.
Economic performance in the baseline projection for FAO-REF-00 is shown 
in Table 3.2. For the analysis reported here, the economic growth characteristics 
were calibrated by country or regional group to match basic assumptions in the 
FAO perspective study based on information provided by the World Agriculture 
Towards 2030/2050 study group at FAO (J. Bruinsma, May 2009, personal 
communication).
2. Details of the various scenarios are given in Table 3.26.
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While the recent economic growth rates of more than 8 percent a year 
in China and India may have been dented by the recent world financial crisis, 
relatively robust economic growth in China, India and other middle-income 
developing countries is expected in the next two decades.
table 3.1
population development
Region
Total population (million people)
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
North America 306 337 367 392 413 430
Europe and Russian Federation 752 762 766 761 748 729
Pacific OECD 150 153 152 148 142 135
Sub-Saharan Africa 655 842 1 056 1 281 1 509 1 723
Latin America 505 574 638 689 725 744
Near East and North Africa 303 370 442 511 575 629
East Asia 1 402 1 500 1 584 1 633 1 630 1 596
South and Southeast Asia 1 765 2 056 2 328 2 553 2 723 2 839
Rest of worlda 210 233 249 262 272 280
Developed 1 141 1 177 1 202 1 211 1 210 1 198
Developing 4 696 5 417 6 132 6 758 7 257 7 627
World 6 047 6 827 7 582 8 231 8 739 9 105
a  The regionalization used in the WFS model is described in Annex 3.2.
Source: UN, 2009.
table 3.2
gdp at constant 1990 prices, baseline projection fao-ref-00 
Region
GDP (billion USD at constant 1990 prices)
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
North America 8 286 10 582 12 427 13 817 15 480 17 050
Europe and Russian Federation 7 502 9 487 11 621 14 037 16 860 19 832
Pacific OECD 3 795 4 304 4 781 5 173 5 534 5 888
Sub-Saharan Africa 238 350 531 808 1 236 1 894
Latin America 1 450 2 014 2 822 4 267 6 284 8 828
Near East and North Africa 597 850 1 212 1 772 2 623 3 845
East Asia 1 596 4 165 8 037 13 106 18 373 24 625
South and Southeast Asia 1 255 2 020 3 136 4 840 7 293 10 139
Rest of world 2 418 3 000 3 640 4 343 5 103 5 913
Developed 19 583 24 372 28 830 33 028 37 875 42 770
Developing 5 135 9 399 15 738 24 795 35 810 49 331
World 27 136 36 771 48 207 62 165 78 788 98 014
Sources: IIASA WFS simulations; FAO-REF-00 scenario, May 2009.
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Agricultural demand and production
Crop production is driven by developments in yields and crop areas. In many 
developing countries, the crop yields for most commodities are lower than those 
attained in developed countries (Table 3.3). At the global level, grain yields 
increased by an average of about 2 percent a year in the period 1970 to 1990, but 
this rate has halved since then.
With still considerable population growth in the reference projections of the 
FAO-REF-00 scenario, total production of cereals increases from 2.1 billion tonnes in 
2000 to 2.9 billion tonnes in 2030, and to 3.4 billion tonnes in 2050. While developing 
countries produced about half the global cereal harvest in 2000, their share in total 
production increases steadily, reaching 57 percent by 2050. As developing countries’ 
share in global consumption increases from 55 to 64 percent in the reference projection, 
their net imports of cereals grow over time, from 120 million tonnes in 2000 to about 
220 million tonnes in 2030, and to 250 million tonnes by 2050.
Agricultural prices
Real prices of agricultural crops declined by a factor of more than two between 
the late 1970s and the early 1990s, and then stagnated until about 2002, when food 
prices started to rise. The long-term trend in declining food prices has had several 
table 3.3
total cereal production and consumption: baseline simulation without climate 
change and biofuel expansion, fao-ref-00
Region
Cereal production (million tonnes) Cereal consumption (million tonnes)
2000 2020 2030 2050 2000 2020 2030 2050
North America 474 588 645 707 304 354 376 404
Europe and Russian  
  Federation 526 552 575 650 545 590 621 684
Pacific OECD 40 48 49 55 46 50 52 52
Sub-Saharan Africa 76 133 172 265 106 179 233 347
Latin America 130 197 221 269 139 196 227 272
Near East and North Africa 55 82 94 122 99 148 179 234
East Asia 423 525 568 636 461 570 620 677
South and Southeast Asia 345 450 496 573 341 453 494 573
Rest of world 75 94 103 125 103 120 128 146
Developed 1 008 1 149 1 229 1 363 858 945 993 1 072
Developing 1 060 1 425 1 590 1 914 1 183 1 596 1 808 2 171
World 2 143 2 668 2 923 3 402 2 144 2 661 2 928 3 388
Sources: IIASA WFS simulations; FAO-REF-00 scenario, May 2009.
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drivers: population development and slowing demographic growth; technological 
development and growing input use in agriculture, notably a substantial increase 
in productivity since the green revolution of the early 1970s; and support policies 
maintaining relatively inelastic agricultural supply in developed countries.
The index of world food prices increased by 140 percent between 2002 
and 2007, primarily as a result of increased demand for cereals and oilseeds for 
biofuels, low world food stocks, reduced harvests owing to drought conditions in 
locations such as Australia and Europe, record oil and fertilizer prices, and world 
market speculation. Since the second half of 2008, agricultural prices have again 
been decreasing substantially.
The baseline projection of the FAO-REF-00 scenario is characterized by 
modest increases in world market prices between 2000 and 2050. Table 3.4 shows 
the projected price indices for crops and livestock products in comparison with 
1990 levels for a reference simulation without climate change or the expansion 
of biofuel production. This is also partly the outcome of an assumed further 
reduction of agricultural support and protection measures.3 
Risk of hunger
In 1970, 940 million people in developing countries – a third of their total 
population – were regarded as chronically undernourished. Over the following 
two decades, the number of undernourished people declined by some 120 million, 
to an estimated 815 million in 1990. The largest reduction occurred in East Asia, 
where the decline was from 500 million in 1970 to about 250 million in 1990. The 
numbers of undernourished people increased slightly in South Asia and almost 
3. Price dynamics depend critically on assumed long-term rates of technological progress in 
agriculture. The price trends presented here should therefore not be interpreted as predictions of 
future price development but as a characteristic of the chosen reference simulation.
table 3.4
agricultural prices, baseline projection fao-ref-00
Commodity group
Price index (1990 = 100)
2020 2030 2040 2050
Crops 94 99 107 113
Cereals 104 106 114 123
Other crops 90 95 103 108
Livestock products 107 110 115 119
Agriculture 98 102 109 115
Sources: IIASA WFS simulations; FAO-REF-00 scenario, May 2009.
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doubled in sub-Saharan Africa. The total number of undernourished people in 
developing countries declined further from 815 million in 1990 to 776 million 
in 2000. During this period, the number of undernourished in sub-Saharan 
Africa increased from 168 to 194 million. Africa has the highest proportion of 
undernourished people, at about 35 percent of the total population, compared with 
about 14 percent in the rest of the developing world (Figure 3.2).
The FAO-REF-00 scenario projects a globally decreasing number of people 
at risk of hunger (Table 3.5). The projected decrease is most pronounced in East 
and South Asia. A projected further increase in the number of people at risk of 
hunger in Africa is expected to result in Africa accounting for 35 percent of the 
total in 2020 and 40 percent in 2030. Although representing some progress in 
mitigating hunger, the projected development in scenario FAO-REF-00 is far 
from sufficient to meet the reductions necessary for achieving the Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG).
figure 3.2
Historical trends in numbers of undernourished people, developing countries
The estimate for 2007 is based on partial data for 2006 to 2008 and uses a simplified methodology, 
so should be regarded as provisional.
Sources: FAO, 2008b; 2001. 
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Crop and livestock production value added
In the FAO-REF-00 scenario, the global value added of crop and livestock production 
in 2000 amounts to USD 1 260 billion in 1990 dollars (Table 3.6). This is projected to 
increase by 30 percent in the 20 years to 2020. In 2030 and 2050 the projected values 
added amount to respectively USD 1 836 billion and USD 2 192 billion (in 1990 dollars).
Cultivated land
Some 1.6 billion ha of land is currently used for crop production, with nearly 
1 billion ha under cultivation in the developing countries. During the last 30 years, 
the global crop area expanded by some 5 million ha a year, with Latin America 
table 3.6
value added of crop and livestock sector, baseline projection fao-ref-00 
Region
Value added (billion USD)
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
North America 166 179 192 203 214 226
Europe and Russian Federation 206 220 235 245 255 264
Pacific OECD 47 52 57 62 67 71
Sub-Saharan Africa 65 82 105 133 165 198
Latin America 155 190 227 262 289 308
Near East and North Africa 55 70 86 104 122 141
East Asia 249 282 314 342 365 384
South and Southeast Asia 252 299 348 400 450 498
Rest of world 65 71 78 85 93 101
Developed 419 451 483 510 535 561
Developing 775 923 1 081 1 241 1 391 1 530
World 1 259 1 445 1 642 1 836 2 019 2 192
Sources: IIASA WFS simulations; FAO-REF-00 scenario, May 2009.
table 3.5
people at risk of hunger, baseline projection fao-ref-00
Region
People at risk of hunger (millions)
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Sub-Saharan Africa 196 252 286 271 258 239
Latin America 56 43 31 20 14 10
Near East and North Africa 42 51 57 53 52 47
East Asia 173 139 104 68 42 26
South and Southeast Asia 364 378 362 278 192 136
Developing countries 833 864 839 691 557 458
Sources: IIASA WFS simulations; FAO-REF-00 scenario, May 2009.
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accounting for 35 percent of this increase. The potential for arable land expansion 
exists predominantly in South America and Africa, where just seven countries 
account for 70 percent of this potential. There is relatively little scope for arable 
land expansion in Asia, which is home to some 60 percent of the world’s population.
table 3.7
cultivated area, baseline projection fao-ref-00
Region
Cultivated area (million ha)
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
North America 234 235 236 237 241 244
Europe and Russian Federation 339 337 336 334 334 334
Pacific OECD 57 57 57 57 60 61
Sub-Saharan Africa 226 245 265 284 301 315
Latin America 175 193 208 217 223 224
Near East and North Africa 67 69 70 72 73 74
East Asia 147 146 146 146 145 145
South and Southeast Asia 274 281 286 289 292 293
Rest of world 42 41 40 38 38 37
Developed 604 602 601 602 606 610
Developing 915 960 1 002 1 035 1 063 1 081
World 1 561 1 603 1 643 1 676 1 707 1 727
Sources: IIASA WFS simulations; FAO-REF-00 scenario, May 2009.
table 3.8
Harvested area, baseline projection fao-ref-00
Region
Harvested area (million ha)
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
North America 196 203 210 215 223 231
Europe and Russian Federation 215 216 218 219 221 223
Pacific OECD 25 26 27 28 30 31
Sub-Saharan Africa 134 152 174 194 214 231
Latin America 126 143 160 171 179 180
Near East and North Africa 42 46 50 53 56 59
East Asia 220 224 228 231 233 234
South and Southeast Asia 312 327 341 350 356 359
Rest of world 35 35 35 35 35 35
Developed 421 429 438 446 457 468
Developing 850 909 968 1 016 1 055 1 080
World 1 306 1 373 1 441 1 497 1 547 1 583
Sources: IIASA WFS simulations; FAO-REF-00 scenario, May 2009.
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Projected global use of cultivated land in the FAO-REF-00 baseline scenario 
increases by about 165 million ha from 2000 to 2050. While aggregate arable land 
use in developed countries remains fairly stable, practically all of the net increases 
occur in developing countries. Africa and South America together account for 85 
percent of the expansion of cultivated land (Table 3.7).
Cultivated land represents the physical amount of land used for crop 
production. In practice, part of this land is left idle or fallow, and part is used to 
produce more than one crop within a year. The total harvested area in the FAO-
REF-00 scenario is shown in Table 3.8. The implied cropping intensity in the 
baseline projection increases from about 84 percent in 2000 to 89 percent in 2030, 
and to 92 percent in 2050.
Climate change impacts on crop suitability and production potential
Climate change and variability affect thermal and hydrological regimes, which 
in turn influence the structure and functionality of ecosystems and human 
livelihoods.
Scenarios of climate change have been developed to estimate the effects 
on crop yields, land areas with cultivation potential, and the numbers and types 
of crop combination that can be cultivated. A climate change scenario is defined 
as a physically consistent set of changes in meteorological variables, based on 
generally accepted projections of CO2 (and other trace gas) levels.
For the spatial assessment of agronomic impacts of climate change on 
crop yields under the AEZ family of crop models, climate change parameters 
are computed for each grid point of the resource inventory by comparing the 
GCM monthly mean prediction for the given decade with those corresponding 
to the GCM baseline climate of 1960 to 1990. Such changes (e.g., differences 
in temperature, ratios of precipitation) are then applied to the observed climate for 
1960 to 1990 used in AEZ, to generate future climate data as a plausible range of 
outcomes in terms of likely future temperatures, rainfall, incoming sunlight, etc. for 
the nominal years 2025 (termed the 2020s), 2055 (the 2050s) and 2085 (the 2080s).
The range of results computed in AEZ refers to different assumptions 
concerning autonomous adaptation in cropping and the effects of CO2 fertilization 
on crop yields (Table 3.9). The first variant is quantified without considering the 
effects of CO2 fertilization, and assumes that farmers would be able to change 
cropping dates and crop types but would be limited to local crop varieties, i.e., 
those with the same temperature characteristics and moisture requirements as 
the land utilization types (LUTs) used in the current climate. The second variant 
refers to results when CO2 fertilization is still not considered, but best adapted 
plant types, such as those available elsewhere and adapted to higher temperatures, 
106
How can climate change and bioenergy alter the outlook for food and agriculture?
are available to maximize production potential. Variants 3 and 4 take into account 
the effects of CO2 fertilization and quantify the outcomes with limited and full 
adaptation of crop types, respectively. 
The results presented in Table 3.9 are based on a spatial climate change 
scenario derived from outputs of the United Kingdom’s HadCM3 model (Gordon 
et al., 2000; Pope et al., 2000) for the IPCC SRES A2 emissions pathway 
(Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000).
table 3.9 
impacts of climate change on production potential of rainfed wheat on current 
cultivated land, Hadley a2 (2050s)
Change with respect to reference climate (%)
Region
Cultivated land 
(million ha)
Without CO2 
fertilization: 
current crop 
types
Without CO2 
fertilization: 
adapted crop 
types
With CO2 
fertilization: 
current crop 
types
With CO2 
fertilization: 
adapted crop 
types
North America 230 -9 -9 -3 -3
Europe 179 -4 -4 3 3
Russian Federation 126 -1 -1 5 5
Central America and 
Caribbean 43 -48 -57 -45 -54
South America 129 -24 -26 -20 -22
Oceania and Polynesia 53 11 12 16 18
North Africa and West Asia 59 -8 -7 -2 -1
  North Africa 19 -16 -14 -11 -9
  West Asia 40 -4 -4 2 2
Sub-Saharan Africa 225 -56 -61 -54 -59
  Eastern Africa 83 -59 -65 -57 -63
  Central Africa 38 -76 -80 -75 -80
  Southern Africa 17 -44 -47 -41 -44
  Western Africa 86 -98 -99 -98 -98
Asia 519 -16 -17 -11 -13
  Southeast Asia 98 -55 -58 -53 -56
  South Asia 229 -40 -43 -37 -40
  East Asia and Japan 151 -8 -9 -3 -5
  Central Asia 41 15 15 21 21
Developed 591 -5 -5 1 2
Developing 972 -22 -24 -18 -20
World 1 563 -10 -11 -5 -5
Source: GAEZ 2009 simulations, May 2009.
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Except for countries in Central Asia, the impact of climate change on wheat 
production in developing countries is generally negative. In contrast, the rainfed 
wheat production potential of current cultivated land in Europe, the Russian 
Federation and Oceania is increasing. The net global balance is projected to be a 
reduction of production potential of 5 to 10 percent by the 2050s.
Table 3.10 summarizes the simulated AEZ results for rainfed grain maize. The 
global production potential of current cultivated land under projected HadCM3 
climate conditions for the 2050s increases in all four variants, owing to a modest 
table 3.10
impacts of climate change on production potential of rainfed maize on current 
cultivated land, Hadley a2 2050s
Change with respect to reference climate (%)
Region
Cultivated land 
(million ha)
Without CO2 
fertilization: 
current crop 
types
Without CO2 
fertilization: 
adapted crop 
types
With CO2 
fertilization: 
current crop 
types
With CO2 
fertilization: 
adapted crop 
types
North America 230 -5 -1 -2 2
Europe 179 23 23 28 27
Russian Federation 126 61 61 66 67
Central America and 
Caribbean 43 1 5 5 9
South America 129 -3 2 0 6
Oceania and Polynesia 53 27 30 31 34
North Africa and West Asia 59 31 30 34 34
  North Africa 19 51 52 55 56
  West Asia 40 23 22 26 25
Sub-Saharan Africa 225 -6 -3 -3 1
  Eastern Africa 83 1 5 5 9
  Central Africa 38 -4 1 -1 5
  Southern Africa 17 -45 -44 -43 -43
  Western Africa 86 -8 -5 -5 -1
Asia 519 -2 2 2 6
  Southeast Asia 98 2 6 5 9
  South Asia 229 -7 -3 -3 1
  East Asia and Japan 151 3 7 7 11
  Central Asia 41 23 26 26 30
Developed 591 13 15 17 19
Developing 972 -3 1 1 5
World 1 563 2 5 6 9
Source: GAEZ 2009 simulations, May 2009.
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increase (or an only slight aggregated decrease) in the grain maize potential in 
developing countries and a significant increase in developed regions. Despite this 
improvement at the global level, there are several regions where maize production 
potential decreases, including sub-Saharan Africa.
The results compiled in Table 3.11 go beyond climate change impacts 
for single crops. The computations look at all cereal types represented in AEZ 
(some 118 LUTs covering wheat, rice, maize, barley, sorghum, millet, rye, oats 
and buckwheat) and determine separately for current and future climate conditions 
the most productive cereal type in each grid-cell of the spatial resource inventory. 
Results indicate a somewhat increasing global rainfed production potential, 
provided that CO2 fertilization is effective and full adaptation of crop types is 
table 3.11 
impacts of climate change on production potential of rainfed cereals on current 
cultivated land, Hadley a2 2050s
Change with respect to reference climate (%)
Region
Cultivated land 
(million ha)
Without CO2 
fertilization: 
current crop 
types
Without CO2 
fertilization: 
adapted 
crop types
With CO2 
fertilization: 
current crop 
types
With CO2 
fertilization: 
adapted 
crop types
North America 230 -7 -6 -1 0
Europe 179 -4 -4 3 3
Russian Federation 126 3 3 9 9
Central America and Caribbean 43 -10 -6 -6 -2
South America 129 -8 -3 -4 1
Oceania and Polynesia 53 2 4 6 8
North Africa and West Asia 59 -8 -7 -2 -1
  North Africa 19 -15 -13 -10 -8
  West Asia 40 -4 -4 1 1
Sub-Saharan Africa 225 -7 -3 -3 1
  Eastern Africa 83 -3 2 2 6
  Central Africa 38 -7 -2 -3 3
  Southern Africa 17 -32 -31 -29 -28
  Western Africa 86 -7 -4 -3 1
Asia 519 -3 1 2 5
  Southeast Asia 98 -5 -1 -1 4
  South Asia 229 -6 -2 -2 2
  East Asia and Japan 151 2 6 7 10
  Central Asia 41 14 14 19 19
Developed 591 -3 -3 2 3
Developing 972 -5 -2 -1 3
World 1 563 -5 -2 0 3
Source: GAEZ 2009 simulations, May 2009.
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achieved; climate change could result in a reduction of about 5 percent of global 
production if these two conditions are not met. In the latter case, most regions 
would experience a reduction. At the regional level, results for Southern Africa, 
North Africa and Central America show the largest negative climate change 
impacts on rainfed cereal production potential.
Table 3.12 presents results for the temporal dimension of climate change 
impacts by summarizing simulated results based on HadCM3 for three periods 
– the 2020s, the 2050s and the 2080s. Numbers shown in the table are the best 
outcomes of the four variants assuming or not assuming effective CO2 fertilization 
and full agronomic crop adaptation.
table 3.12 
impacts of climate change on production potential of rainfed cereals on current 
cultivated land with co2 fertilization, Hadley a2
Region
Change with respect to reference climate (%)
Rainfed wheat Rainfed maize Rainfed cereals
2020s 2050s 2080s 2020s 2050s 2080s 2020s 2050s 2080s
North America -1 -3 -2 7 2 -1 1 0 0
Europe 1 3 -1 22 27 21 1 3 -1
Russian Federation 3 5 -1 54 67 63 5 9 6
Central America -33 -54 -76 6 9 -1 -1 -2 -15
South America -14 -22 -33 2 6 5 1 1 -1
Oceania and Polynesia -8 18 9 12 34 58 -7 8 2
North Africa and West Asia 2 -1 -12 19 34 39 2 -1 -11
  North Africa 2 -9 -28 38 56 60 2 -8 -23
  West Asia 2 2 -6 12 25 31 2 1 -5
Sub-Saharan Africa -36 -59 -76 1 1 1 1 1 0
  Eastern Africa -38 -63 -81 6 9 11 3 6 9
  Central Africa -53 -80 -95 5 5 5 2 3 2
  Southern Africa -27 -44 -61 -29 -43 -32 -20 -28 -24
  Western Africa -77 -98 -100 1 -1 -6 1 1 -5
Asia -7 -13 -31 2 6 4 3 5 3
  Southeast Asia -27 -56 -89 4 9 11 2 4 -1
  South Asia -10 -40 -71 1 1 -2 2 2 -1
  East Asia and Japan -9 -5 -16 1 11 12 1 10 12
  Central Asia 10 21 9 25 30 16 16 19 11
Developed 0 2 -1 18 19 16 2 3 1
Developing -11 -20 -36 2 5 3 2 3 0
World -3 -5 -12 7 9 7 2 3 0
Source: GAEZ 2009 simulations, May 2009.
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Results suggest that for the next decades global rainfed cereal production 
potential is not threatened by a gradual change of climate as projected by the 
HadCM3 model for the IPCC SRES A2 emissions scenario, provided that CO2 
fertilization effects materialize and farmers are prepared and empowered to adapt 
fully to a changing climate. It should also be noted that the results in Table 3.12 do 
not account for the impacts of possibly increased climatic variability.
Table 3.13 presents results for AEZ-estimated rainfed crop potentials of wheat, 
maize and sorghum (relative to the reference climate), based on the CSIRO GCM 
climate projections for IPCC A2 emission pathways. Estimates assume full adaptation 
of crop types and include effects of CO2 fertilization due to increased atmospheric 
CO2 concentrations. Table 3.14 summarizes changes relative to the crop potentials 
under current climate and excluding CO2 fertilization effects on crop yield.
table 3.13 
impacts of climate change on production potential of major rainfed cereals on 
current cultivated land with co2 fertilization, cSiro a2 
Region
Change with respect to reference climate (%)
Rainfed wheat Rainfed maize Rainfed sorghum
2020s 2050s 2080s 2020s 2050s 2080s 2020s 2050s 2080s
North America 3 10 7 3 9 7 15 25 28
Europe 2 3 -1 40 47 47 31 41 37
Russian Federation 4 4 -15 64 79 69 60 75 70
Central America -19 -36 -53 2 7 13 3 10 17
South America -12 -19 -30 2 3 4 8 10 15
Oceania and Polynesia 4 11 4 19 31 57 4 9 7
North Africa and West Asia 2 -1 -12 42 71 69 11 17 13
  North Africa 1 4 -18 66 160 183 12 31 20
  West Asia 3 -3 -9 33 38 26 11 12 9
Sub-Saharan Africa -27 -45 -69 0 -2 -7 1 0 -4
  Eastern Africa -30 -48 -72 3 4 -1 4 4 -2
  Central Africa -34 -58 -84 2 2 -1 5 6 7
  Southern Africa -18 -34 -58 -26 -47 -51 -24 -41 -45
  Western Africa -76 -98 -100 0 -1 -7 1 2 -1
Asia -8 -23 -45 0 1 0 3 5 4
  Southeast Asia -35 -48 -79 0 0 1 -2 -5 -5
  South Asia -22 -45 -70 -1 -3 -5 1 0 0
  East Asia and Japan -7 -21 -38 2 5 2 5 11 11
  Central Asia 19 18 -7 34 87 110 27 35 31
Developed 3 7 0 23 30 29 27 38 37
Developing -10 -23 -42 1 1 0 4 5 4
World -1 -3 -13 8 10 9 12 16 16
Source: GAEZ 2009 simulations, May 2009.
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The results of the AEZ analysis using HadCM3 and CSIRO climate 
projections for IPCC A2 emission pathways suggest three conclusions: i) in a 
number of regions, climate change poses a significant threat for food production; 
ii) the global balance of the food production potential from rainfed cereal 
production on current cultivated land may improve slightly in the short term – 
farmers’ adaptation to a changing climate, and the strength of the CO2 fertilization 
effect on crop yields will be decisive factors in realizing a positive global balance 
of food production potential; and iii) beyond 2050, negative impacts of warming 
will dominate and cause a rapid decrease of the crop production potential in most 
regions and for the global aggregate.
table 3.14 
impacts of climate change on production potential of major rainfed cereals on 
current cultivated land without co2 fertilization, cSiro a2
Region
Change with respect to reference climate (%)
Rainfed wheat Rainfed maize Rainfed sorghum
2020s 2050s 2080s 2020s 2050s 2080s 2020s 2050s 2080s
North America 0 4 -3 2 5 2 12 20 21
Europe -1 -3 -11 37 42 40 29 35 30
Russian Federation 1 -2 -23 61 73 62 57 68 62
Central America -21 -39 -57 0 3 7 1 6 11
South America -14 -23 -36 0 -1 -1 6 6 10
Oceania and Polynesia 2 6 -4 17 27 50 2 6 3
North Africa and West Asia 0 -7 -19 41 66 62 9 14 8
  North Africa -2 -2 -25 64 153 171 10 27 15
  West Asia 0 -9 -17 32 34 21 9 8 5
Sub-Saharan Africa -28 -47 -72 -2 -5 -12 -1 -3 -8
  Eastern Africa -31 -50 -74 1 0 -7 2 0 -7
  Central Africa -35 -60 -85 1 -1 -6 3 3 2
  Southern Africa -20 -37 -61 -27 -49 -54 -25 -43 -48
  Western Africa -76 -98 -100 -1 -5 -12 0 -2 -6
Asia -10 -27 -49 -1 -2 -5 2 1 -1
  Southeast Asia -36 -51 -80 -2 -4 -4 -4 -7 -9
  South Asia -23 -47 -72 -3 -7 -10 -1 -4 -5
  East Asia and Japan -9 -24 -43 0 1 -3 3 7 5
  Central Asia 17 12 -14 33 81 101 25 31 26
Developed 0 0 -10 21 25 22 25 32 30
Developing -13 -27 -46 -1 -2 -5 2 1 -1
World -4 -8 -21 6 6 4 10 12 10
Source: GAEZ 2009 simulations, May 2009.
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In the short term, policy-makers need to strengthen farmers’ adaptation 
capacity and support strategies for coping with climate variability and extreme 
events that may severely affect the welfare of the most vulnerable populations. 
In the long run, if climate change is not halted, it will result in irreparable 
damage to arable land, water and biodiversity resources, with eventually serious 
consequences for food production and food security.
Impacts of climate change on world food system indicators
The potential impacts of climate change on production and trade of agricultural 
commodities, particularly cereals, were evaluated in two steps. First, simulations 
were undertaken in which current climate and atmospheric conditions prevailed. 
Second, yield impacts due to temperature and CO2 changes, derived from the 
agro-ecological assessment, were simulated using the WFS model and compared 
with the respective outcomes without climate change. Assumptions and results 
for the reference projection were presented in the section on Baseline assessment.
Data on crop yield changes were estimated with AEZ for different climate 
change scenarios, and were compiled to provide yield impact parameterizations 
for the countries or regions covered in the WFS model. Yield variations caused by 
climate change were introduced into the yield response functions by means of a 
multiplicative factor with an impact on the relevant parameters in the mathematical 
representation (i.e., the crop yield functions).
Exogenous variables, population growth and technical progress were left at 
the levels specified in the respective reference projections. No specific adjustment 
policies for counteracting altered agricultural performance were assumed 
beyond the farm-level adaptations resulting from economic adjustments by 
individual actors in the national models The adjustment processes in the different 
scenarios are the outcome of the imposed yield changes triggering changes in 
national production levels and costs, leading to changes in agricultural prices in 
international and national markets; these in turn affect investment allocation and 
labour migration among sectors and within agriculture.
Agricultural prices
Table 3.15 summarizes the outcomes of scenario simulations with regard to 
agricultural prices. It shows the price index deviations, as percentages, relative 
to the equilibrium prices calculated in the reference projection without climate 
change. Price indices were calculated for cereals, overall crops and the aggregate 
of crop and livestock production. Climate scenarios were constructed for both 
the HadCM3 (Gordon et al., 2000; Pope et al., 2000) and the CSIRO (Gordon 
and O’Farrell, 1997; Hirst, Gordon and O’Farrell, 1997) GCM model outputs of 
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IPCC SRES A2 simulations. Table 3.15 gives the results for simulations using 
the Hadley Centre climate model outputs with and without the effects of CO2 
fertilization on crop yields. Again, the climate scenarios do not take into account 
the possibility of increased climate variability, and the results assume successful 
and full agronomic adaptation by farmers.
Overall, climate change yield impacts have only a small impact on world 
market prices in the decades until about mid-century. In fact, the CO2 fertilization 
effect and assumed autonomous adaptation to climate change more than 
compensate for negative yield impacts. Beyond 2050, negative yield impacts 
dominate and cause price increases, simulated at about 20 percent for cereals in 
the 2080s. When CO2 fertilization effects are disregarded, prices start to increase 
gradually in the early decades, and increases are projected to accelerate after 2050. 
In this case, medium-term effects on cereal prices are in the order of 10 percent; in 
the long term – by 2080 – simulated price increases approach 50 percent.
Cereal production and consumption
The impacts of climate change on the production of cereals, resulting from both 
changes in land productivity and the economic responses of actors in the system, 
are summarized in Table 3.16.
The model results present a fairly consistent response to climate change and 
geographical patterns in regional cereal production. At the global level, taking 
table 3.15
impacts of climate change on agricultural prices
Scenario
CO2 
fertilization
Change in price index relative to reference climate (%)
2020 2030 2050 2080
Cereals
 Hadley A2 with -4 -1 -1 23
 Hadley A2 without 1 6 10 44
 CSIRO A2 with 1 3 2 21
Crops
 Hadley A2 with -4 -3 -3 11
 Hadley A2 without 0 4 7 27
 CSIRO A2 with -1 0 0 9
Agriculture
 Hadley A2 with -3 -2 -2 8
 Hadley A2 without 0 3 5 20
 CSIRO A2 with -1 1 0 7
Source: IIASA WFS simulations, May 2009.
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into account economic adjustment of actors and markets, cereal production until 
2050 is about 1 percentage point lower than it is when both CO2 fertilization 
and agronomic adaptation are considered. For the 2080s the differences exceed 
2 percentage points in both the HadCM3 and the CSIRO climate scenarios. When 
CO2 fertilization effects are not considered, simulated global cereal production is 
1.4 percent lower than the baseline in 2050 and more than 4.3 percent lower in 
2080 (representing about 165 million tonnes).
Developing countries consistently experience significant reductions of 
cereal production in all climate scenarios in the long term up to the 2080s. Among 
the most severely affected regions are South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.
In the world of the 2050s and 2080s, consumers are assumed to be much 
richer than they are today and to be largely separated from agricultural production 
processes. They earn their incomes mainly in the non-agricultural sectors. 
Therefore, aggregate changes in consumption depend mainly on food prices and 
income levels rather than on local production conditions. Table 3.17 summarizes 
the changes in total cereal consumption (food, feed, industrial and seed use, and 
waste) occurring in the WFS simulations in response to climate change.
table 3.16
impacts of climate change on cereal production
Change relative to reference scenario (%)
Region
Hadley A2 CSIRO A2
Hadley A2, without CO2 
fertilization
2020 2030 2050 2080 2020 2030 2050 2080 2020 2030 2050 2080
North America 1.9 -2.9 -2.9 -0.8 2.8 0.1 5.8 7.1 0.9 -3.9 -4.6 -4.8
Europe and Russian 
Federation 0.8 2.0 1.8 1.5 0.5 1.7 1.0 3.1 0.1 1.0 0.1 -1.1
Pacific OECD -2.2 2.4 9.5 14.0 2.5 6.9 7.0 18.2 -1.8 2.8 9.3 13.6
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.3 0.3 -2.0 -2.5 -0.6 0.4 -2.9 -7.2 -0.9 0.6 -2.0 -2.2
Latin America 0.9 4.7 5.5 6.0 1.3 3.5 -0.7 0.9 1.3 5.0 6.4 8.0
Near East and North 
Africa -0.5 0.7 1.1 -1.0 5.2 7.7 7.4 -1.0 -0.7 0.3 0.3 -2.2
East Asia 0.1 0.7 2.0 -2.8 -2.2 -2.8 -3.4 -7.2 -0.6 -0.4 0.2 -5.3
South and Southeast Asia -1.3 -1.3 -3.7 -12.2 -4.8 -5.9 -8.9 -12.8 -1.6 -1.9 -4.6 -13.2
Rest of world -1.6 -1.7 -3.1 -4.6 -2.4 -2.8 -3.4 -4.6 -2.6 -3.4 -6.1 -9.0
Developed 1.2 -0.7 -0.3 0.5 1.7 1.1 4.2 5.9 0.3 -1.7 -2.0 -2.8
Developing -0.3 0.7 0.2 -3.9 -1.8 -1.8 -4.2 -7.3 -0.6 0.2 -0.6 -4.9
World 0.3 0.1 -0.2 -2.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -2.1 -0.3 -0.7 -1.4 -4.3
Source: IIASA WFS simulations, May 2009.
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 Table 3.17 shows a fairly uniform decline in cereal consumption in the 
2080s, of about 2 percent globally (representing a reduction of about 80 million 
tonnes compared with the 3.8 billion tonnes of consumption in the reference 
simulation) and about 2.5 percent in developing countries, for both climate 
model scenarios with CO2 fertilization. In the HadCM3 simulation without CO2 
fertilization effects, the reduction is about 4 percent compared with a reference 
scenario without climate change.
Risk of hunger
Estimates of the number of people at risk of hunger vary greatly, depending on 
socio-economic development trajectories (particularly assumed income levels 
and income distribution) and population numbers. Assumptions and results for 
the reference simulation were presented in the section on Baseline assessment. 
Under this reference projection, the estimated number of undernourished would 
slowly decrease from 2010, to about 900 million in 2020, 760 million by 2030, 
530 million by 2050, and 150 million by 2080. For comparison, changes in the 
estimated numbers of people at risk of hunger, at different time points and under 
three different climate scenarios, are summarized in Table 3.18. It is worth noting 
that in these simulations the recorded climate change impacts on undernourishment 
table 3.17
impacts of climate change on cereal consumption
Region
Change relative to reference scenario (%)
Hadley A2 CSIRO A2
Hadley A2, without CO2 
fertilization
2020 2030 2050 2080 2020 2030 2050 2080 2020 2030 2050 2080
North America 0.7 0.3 0.5 -0.4 0.1 -0.3 1.2 1.0 -0.1 -0.8 -1.2 -3.6
Europe and Russian  
Federation 0.8 0.3 0.1 -1.2 0.1 -0.4 -0.7 -1.4 0.1 -0.6 -1.4 -3.6
Pacific OECD 2.2 0.3 1.5 -4.5 0.3 -1.5 -0.4 -5.0 0.3 -2.1 -3.2 -12.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.4 0.1 -0.1 -4.2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.6 -4.0 -0.2 -0.7 -1.4 -6.8
Latin America 0.8 0.3 -0.1 -2.6 0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -2.3 0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -3.4
Near East and North 
Africa 0.2 0.0 -0.1 -2.6 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -2.4 -0.3 -0.7 -1.1 -4.4
East Asia 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -1.0 -0.4 -0.8 -1.4 -0.8 -0.2 -0.4 -0.7 -1.6
South and Southeast Asia 0.0 -1.1 -1.0 -3.9 -0.9 -1.9 -1.5 -3.6 -0.7 -1.9 -2.0 -5.3
Rest of world 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.9 -0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.9 -0.1 -0.4 -0.7 -1.7
Developed 0.7 0.2 0.2 -1.6 0.0 -0.5 0.1 -0.8 0.0 -0.9 -1.7 -4.7
Developing 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -2.5 -0.4 -0.9 -1.1 -2.5 -0.3 -0.8 -1.1 -3.8
World 0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -2.1 -0.2 -0.7 -0.7 -2.0 -0.2 -0.8 -1.2 -4.0
Source: IIASA WFS simulations, May 2009.
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are relatively small. In the early periods, this is owing to relatively small global 
yield impacts and small resulting price effects; in the long term, yield impacts 
become substantial owing to the improved socio-economic conditions and small 
absolute number of undernourished.
In summary, climate change impacts on agriculture will increase the number 
of people at risk of hunger. This impact will be of global significance if imposed 
on an already high level of undernourishment. In the socio-economic development 
scenario underlying the projections of World agriculture: towards 2030/2050 
(FAO, 2006), with solid economic growth and a transition to stable population 
levels after 2050, poverty and hunger, although negatively affected by climate 
change, are a much less ubiquitous phenomenon than they are today.
Cultivated land
The results for changes in cultivated land use are summarized in Table 3.19, and 
results for impacts on the harvested area are shown in Table 3.20. As for other 
food system indicators discussed previously, the changes in net cultivated area 
simulated in response to climate change scenarios up to 2050 are relatively small. 
Even when CO2 fertilization effects are not taken into account, the additional 
land under cultivation globally is less than 10 million ha. Only after 2050, 
when climate change impacts become increasingly negative for crop yields, the 
additional land put into production increases compared with the reference climate 
simulations. In 2080, the estimated increase is 10 to 13 million ha in simulations 
with CO2 fertilization effects accounted for, and 26 million ha in those without CO2 
fertilization. It should be noted that these estimated changes are net global effects 
and should not be confused with gross land conversion, which can be expected to 
be a lot higher in response to climate change impacts and adaptation efforts.
Impacts of biofuel expansion on world food system indicators
Biofuels, mainly ethanol and biodiesel, are produced from a number of agricultural 
crops that are also important for the provision of food and feed. At present, biofuel 
production is spreading around the world in a growing number of countries.
Several developed countries have embraced the apparent win-win opportunity 
to foster the development of biofuels in response to the threats of climate change, 
to lessen their dependency on oil and contribute to enhancing agriculture and rural 
development. Of course, these issues are also of concern to developing countries, 
where more than 70 percent of the poor reside in rural areas. Countries such as 
the United States of America, European Union (EU) countries, China, India, 
Indonesia, South Africa and Thailand have all adopted policy measures and set 
targets for the development of biofuels.
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table 3.18
impacts of climate change on risk of hunger 
Change in number of people at risk of hunger relative to reference scenario 
(millions)
Region
Hadley A2 CSIRO A2
Hadley A2, without CO2 
fertilization
2030 2050 2080 2030 2050 2080 2030 2050 2080
Sub-Saharan Africa 0 1 17 1 0 10 4 9 28
Asia 4 -2 5 22 4 3 27 18 14
Rest of world -2 -2 6 1 0 5 5 9 16
World 1 -3 28 24 4 19 35 36 57
Source: IIASA WFS simulations, May 2009.
table 3.19
impacts of climate change on net use of cultivated land
Change in cultivated area relative to reference scenario (million ha)
Region
Hadley A2 CSIRO A2
Hadley A2, without CO2 
fertilization
2030 2050 2080 2030 2050 2080 2030 2050 2080
Sub-Saharan Africa 0 -1 3 1 0 2 1 2 7
Latin America -1 -2 1 1 1 3 1 3 8
Other developing 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 4
Developed 1 1 5 3 3 6 2 2 6
Developing -2 -4 5 2 1 7 3 5 19
World -1 -3 10 4 4 13 5 8 26
Source: IIASA WFS, May 2009.
table 3.20
impacts of climate change on harvested area
Change relative to reference scenario (million ha)
Region
Hadley A2 CSIRO A2
Hadley A2,without CO2 
fertilization
2030 2050 2080 2030 2050 2080 2030 2050 2080
Sub-Saharan Africa -1 -2 4 1 0 2 2 2 10
Latin America -1 -2 1 1 1 4 1 4 10
Other developing -1 -2 3 -1 -1 1 1 2 9
Developed -1 0 6 3 3 6 2 4 9
Developing -3 -5 8 1 0 7 4 8 29
World -3 -6 14 4 2 14 6 12 39
Source: IIASA WFS, May 2009.
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The main driving forces of biofuel expansion have been huge subsidies and 
the mandates and targets set by national governments. While the justification 
for biofuel targets as enhancing fuel energy security and contributing to climate 
change mitigation and agricultural rural development is appealing, the reality is 
complex as the consequences of biofuel developments result in local, national, 
regional and global impacts across interlinked social, environmental and economic 
domains well beyond the national setting of domestic biofuel targets.
The conditioning factors of biofuel development at the national level 
include the technical capabilities of biofuels as blending agents; agro-ecological 
conditions and the availability of land resources; the suitability, productivity and 
production potential of various biofuel feedstocks; the prospects for regional and 
international trade of biofuels; and the potential greenhouse gas emission savings 
and climate change mitigation.
Overview of biofuel scenarios
The biofuel scenarios used in the model simulations were designed to cover a wide 
and plausible range of possible future demand for biofuels. Scenario specification 
consisted of three steps: first, an overall energy scenario was selected, including 
the regional and global use of transport fuels as one of its components; second, 
pathways were identified based on biofuels’ role in the total use of transport fuels; 
and third, assumptions were defined regarding the role and dynamics of second-
generation biofuel production technologies, or conversely the fraction of total 
biofuel production expected to be supplied by first-generation feedstocks based 
on conventional agricultural crops (maize, sugar cane, cassava, oilseeds, palm 
oil, etc.). Data on current biofuel feedstock use, and the assumptions and biofuel 
scenarios used for the scenario analysis are described in detail in Fischer et al. 
(2009).
Future projections of transport fuel use
The World Energy Outlook (WEO 2008) reference scenario published by the 
International Energy Agency (IEA, 2008b) was used for describing regional 
energy futures. In this reference scenario, world primary energy demand grows by 
an average of 1.6 percent per year from 2006 to 2030, rising from 11 730 million 
tonnes of oil equivalent (TOE) to slightly more than 17 000 million TOE (or by 
about 45 percent). This projection embodies the effects of government policies 
and measures enacted or adopted up to mid-2008. The IEA World Energy Model 
– a large-scale mathematical system designed to replicate how energy markets 
function – was the principal tool used to generate sector-by-sector and fuel-by-
fuel projections by region or country (IEA, 2008b).
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World primary oil demand in the WEO reference scenario increases by about 
40 percent, from 76.3 million barrels per day in 2000 to 106.4 million barrels per 
day in 2030. The transport sector consumes about three-quarters of the projected 
increase in world oil demand (IEA, 2008b).
In terms of total final consumption of transport fuel, the scenario projects an 
increase from 1 962 million TOE in 2000 to 3 171 million TOE in 2030. Regional 
totals of transport fuel consumption, derived from the WEO reference scenario for 
the period 1990 to 2030 and extrapolated to 2050 for use in the WFS simulations, 
are summarized in Table 3.21.
Biofuels use and share in total final consumption of transport fuels
The level and regional pattern of total transport fuel consumption presented in the 
previous subsection has been applied in all the biofuel simulations with the WFS 
model discussed in this paper. Regarding biofuel use, two alternative scenarios 
were implemented: i) biofuel expansion based on the WEO 2008 projections; 
and ii) fast expansion of biofuel production in accordance with the mandates and 
targets announced by several developed and developing countries. In addition, a 
number of sensitivity scenarios were specified to gain understanding over a wide 
range of possible biofuel production levels to 2050.
table 3.21
final consumption of transport fuels, weo scenario
Region
2000 2020 2030 2050
(million TOE)
North America 655 773 773 781
Europe and Russian Federation 519 658 652 609
Pacific OECD 105 110 99 93
Africa 45 69 80 122
East Asia 114 337 495 625
South Asia 111 224 322 544
Latin America 149 253 285 332
Near East and North Africa 108 214 259 342
Rest of world 6 16 24 36
Developed 1 236 1 480 1 460 1 417
Developing 576 1 174 1 529 2 068
Worlda 1 962 2 830 3 171 3 750
a  World totals include international marine bunkers and international aviation.
Source: IEA, 2008b.
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Biofuel consumption in the WEO scenario: Final demand for biofuels in 1990 
was about 6 million TOE, of which two-thirds were produced in Brazil. In 2006, 
world biofuel consumption reached 24.4 million TOE, with the United States of 
America as the largest producer and consumer. In the simulation for 2020, final 
consumption of biofuels in the developed countries is projected at 63 million 
TOE, with the United States and the EU27 accounting for 90 percent of this use. In 
2030, the final consumption of biofuels reaches 79 million TOE in the developed 
world. For 2030 and 2050, the projections of biofuel consumption in developed 
countries amount to 79 and 124 million TOE respectively. 
Among the developing countries, Brazil has been the pioneer, producing about 
5 million TOE in 1990; this is projected to increase to 18 million TOE in 2020. 
Total biofuel consumption in developing countries starts from about 5.5 million 
TOE in 2000, increases to 31 million TOE by 2020, and reaches 46 million TOE 
in 2030. Biofuel use in developing countries in this scenario is dominated by 
Brazil throughout the projection period. Brazil, China and India together account 
for about 80 percent of biofuel use in developing countries, a combined share that 
decreases slightly, to about 75 percent, in 2050. Figure 3.3 shows the dynamics of 
projected biofuel consumption in the WEO-based scenario; panel A indicates the 
fuel split, panel B shows the distribution by region.
figure 3.3 
final consumption of biofuels, weo scenario
Source: Fischer et al., 2009.
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Biofuels consumption in the target (TAR) scenario: The WEO 2008 report states 
“… assume in the Reference Scenario that the biofuel mandates in China and the 
European Union will be met after a lag of a few years but that biofuels in the United 
States in 2030 will attain only about 40 percent of the very ambitious target in the 
2007 Energy Independence and Security Act. Asia and OECD Europe experience 
faster rates of growth, but in absolute terms these increases trail those in the larger 
North American market. Biofuels demand in the OECD Pacific region remains 
modest. Growth in Latin America is moderate, a consequence of the sizeable share 
of the market in Brazil already held by biofuels” (IEA, 2008b: 172).
A number of countries have defined mandatory, voluntary or indicative targets 
for transport fuels (Table 3.22). To gain a better understanding of the possible 
impacts on the world food system that may result from implementation and full 
achievement of the specified targets, a second biofuels scenario, more ambitious 
in terms of biofuel expansion than the WEO outlook, was implemented. In this 
TAR scenario, final consumption of biofuels increases to 189 million TOE in 
2020 (about twice the value achieved in WEO) and climbs to 295 million TOE in 
2030 and 424 million TOE in 2050. As hardly any country has announced biofuel 
table 3.22
voluntary and mandatory targets for transport fuels in major countries
Country/region Mandatory, voluntary or indicative target
Australia At least 350 million litres of biofuels by 2010
Canada 5% renewable content in gasoline by 2010
EU 5.75% of biofuel by 2010, 10% by 2020 
Germany 6.25% of biofuel by 2010, 10% by 2020
France 7% of biofuel by 2010, 10% by 2015, 10% by 2020
Japan 0.6% of auto fuel by 2010; fossil oil dependence in the transport sector reduced 
from 98% to 80% by 2030
New Zealand 3.4% of both gasoline and diesel by 2012
United States 12 billion gallons (55 billion litres) by 2010, 20.5 billion gallons (91 billion litres) 
by 2015, 36 billion gallons (164 billion litres) by 2022; 16 billion gallons (73 
billion litres) from advanced cellulosic ethanol
Brazil Mandatory 25% ethanol blend with gasoline; 5% biodiesel blend by 2010
China 2 million tonnes of ethanol by 2010, 10 million tonnes by 2020; 0.2 million 
tonnes biodiesel by 2010, 2 million tonnes by 2020
India 5% ethanol blending in gasoline in 2008, 10% in 2009; indicative target of 20% 
ethanol blending in gasoline and 20% biodiesel blending by 2017
Indonesia 2% biofuels in energy mix by 2010, 3% by 2015, 5% by 2020
Thailand 2% biodiesel blend by 2008, 10% by 2012; 10% ethanol blend by 2012
South Africa 2% of biofuels by 2013
Source: Fischer et al., 2009.
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targets beyond about 2020, this scenario should be interpreted as the extension of a 
rapid and ambitious biofuel development pathway based on the targets announced 
up to 2020. It approximately doubles biofuel consumption compared with the 
WEO projections. Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of biofuel consumption by 
type and region under the TAR scenario.
It is worth noting that in the TAR scenario the share of developing countries 
in total biofuel consumption is higher than in the WEO scenario, owing to the 
fairly ambitious proposed or announced targets for China, India, Indonesia and 
Thailand. This change in the regional distribution means that biodiesel’s share in 
total biofuels increases somewhat compared with WEO.
Share of biofuel consumption in total transport fuels: In the developed world, 
the projected share of biofuel consumption in total transport fuels use in 2020 
amounts to 4.3 percent in the WEO scenario. By 2030, this share increases to 
5.5 percent. For the developing world, the WEO scenario projects biofuel shares 
in total transport fuel use of 2.7 percent in 2020 and 3.0 percent in 2030. At the 
global level, the shares come to 3.5 percent in 2020, 4.2 percent in 2030, and 
6.0 percent in 2050.  With a road transport share of 70 to 75 percent in total 
figure 3.4
final consumption of biofuels, tar scenario    
Source: Fischer et al., 2009.
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transport fuel use, biofuels would account for 4.5 percent of road transport in 
2020, 5.4 percent in 2030, and 7.6 percent in 2050.  
Share of second-generation biofuels in total biofuel consumption
In recent years, second-generation biofuels using woody or herbaceous non-food 
plant materials as feedstocks have attracted great attention because they are seen 
as superior to conventional feedstocks in terms of their greenhouse gas saving 
potential, while their potential for production on “non-food” land is seen as being 
even more valuable.
It is widely acknowledged that major technological breakthroughs will be 
required to improve feedstock materials and the efficiency of the conversion 
process before second-generation biofuels can make a significant contribution.
To complete the definition of biofuel scenarios in this assessment, three variants 
for both the WEO and the TAR biofuel scenarios were specified. These represent 
alternative views/expectations regarding the dynamics of technology deployment for 
second-generation fuels. The variants are defined on the basis of different pathways 
for the share of second-generation fuels in total biofuel consumption. Specification 
was done by broad regions and follows simple and transparent assumptions. The 
assumptions used for ethanol are summarized in Table 3.23.
The variant V1 (of both WEO and TAR) assumes that second-generation 
biofuel technologies will be available for commercial deployment in the United 
States of America by 2015. Lignocellulose conversion will contribute 7.5 percent 
of total bioethanol by 2020, rising to 25 percent by 2030. In other OECD 
countries, it is assumed that second-generation conversion plants will take off 
from 2020, occupying a share of 12.5 percent by 2030. The biofuel champions 
among developing countries (Brazil, China and India) will also start using second-
generation technologies in 2020, but deployment follows a somewhat slower path 
to reach only 5 percent of total ethanol in 2030. The V2 variant portrays a delayed 
development of second-generation technologies. Conversion plants are assumed 
to become available only by 2030, implying that all transport biofuel production 
up to 2030 relies on conventional feedstocks.
Scenario variant V3 assumes an early and accelerated deployment of second-
generation technologies. In TAR-V3, biochemical ethanol processing and Fischer-
Tropsch (FT) diesel plants are already available in 2010, and in OECD countries 
contribute 10 percent of biofuels by 2015, increasing to more than 30 percent 
in 2020. In developed countries, second-generation biofuels account for about 
50 percent of total biofuels in 2030, and more than two-thirds in 2050. China and 
India follow this development with a short delay. The shares of second-generation 
biofuels in these two countries are set at 10 percent in 2020, one-third in 2030, 
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and half in 2050. Other developing countries start deploying second-generation 
plants in 2020, reaching shares of 10 percent in 2030, and 33 percent in 2050.
At the aggregate global level, second-generation biofuel shares in scenario 
variant WEO-V1 are 3 percent in 2020, 13 percent in 2030, and 30 percent in 
2050. In scenario variant TAR-V1, these shares are respectively 2, 12 and 26 
percent – somewhat lower than in the WEO scenario owing to the higher shares 
achieved by developing countries  in the TAR scenario. For variant TAR-V3, with 
an assumed accelerated second-generation development and deployment path, the 
respective shares are 22, 38 and 55 percent.
Sensitivity analysis of biofuels share in total transport fuels
In addition to the WEO and TAR biofuel scenarios, four sensitivity (SNS) 
scenarios were computed to scan the WFS model outcomes for a broad range of 
imposed first-generation biofuel production levels, from 2 to 8 percent in 2020, 
2.5 to 10 percent in 2030, and 3 to 12 percent in 2050. Table 3.24 summarizes the 
assumed shares of first-generation biofuels in total transport fuel use for different 
scenarios and time points.
table 3.23
Shares of second-generation biofuels in total biofuels
Scenario Region
Share of second-generation biofuels (%)
2015 2020 2030 2050
WEO-V1, TAR-V1 United States Starts 7.5 25 50
Other OECD None Starts 12.5 33
Russian Federation None Starts 5 20
Brazil/China/India None Starts 5 20
Other developing None None None None
WEO-V2, TAR-V2 All countries None None Starts 10
WEO-V3 United States 10 24 40 66
EU27 None 10 33 50
Other OECD None 10 33 50
Russian Federation None 5 20 40
China/India Starts 5 20 40
Other developing 0 0 10 20
TAR-V3 United States 10 35 55 70
EU27 10 31 47 67
Other OECD 10 31 47 67
Russian Federation Starts 10 33 50
China/India Starts 10 33 50
Other developing 0 Starts 10 33
Source: Fischer et al., 2009.
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First-generation biofuel feedstocks demanded in selected biofuel scenarios
Estimates for 2008 indicate that about 80 to 85 million tonnes of cereals were used 
for ethanol production, mainly maize in the United States of America, and about 
10 million tonnes of vegetable oil for biodiesel production, dominated by the 
EU. In the reference scenario FAO-REF-01, these amounts are kept constant for 
the simulation period to 2050. The amounts increase in both the WEO and TAR 
scenario variants. The time path in each scenario variant depends on the level 
and geographical distribution of biofuel production and on assumptions regarding 
the availability of second-generation technologies. The amounts of cereals and 
vegetable oils required for transport biofuel production in 2020, 2030 and 2050 in 
selected biofuel scenarios are shown in Table 3.25.
Impacts of first-generation biofuel expansion on food system indicators
This section presents the results of an integrated spatial ecological and economic 
assessment of the impacts of accelerated expansion of biofuel production, 
evaluated in the context of the world food economy and global resource base.
table 3.25 
use of cereals and vegetable oils for biofuel production 
Scenario
Cereals (million tonnes) Vegetable oils (million tonnes)
2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050
FAO-REF-01 83 83 83 10 10 10
WEO-V1 181 206 246 26 30 44
WEO-V2 192 258 376 26 33 48
TAR-V1 327 437 446 58 85 112
TAR-V3 238 272 262 46 59 61
Source: IIASA WFS simulations, May 2009.
table 3.24
Shares and total amounts of first-generation biofuels 
Scenario
Share in total transport fuels (%)
First-generation biofuels 
consumption (million TOE)
2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050
SNS-V1 2 2.5 3 54 76 106
SNS-V2 4 5 6 107 151 211
SNS-V3 6 7.5 9 161 227 317
SNS-V4 8 10 12 214 302 423
Source: Fischer et al., 2009.
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Previous sections presented the analysis framework used in this study, and 
key assumptions regarding economic development and transport energy demand, 
particularly use of first- and second-generation biofuels. Internally consistent 
sets of assumptions were formulated as model scenarios and used to quantify the 
impacts of expanding biofuel use on agriculture and world food system outcomes. 
A total of ten scenarios were analysed; the acronyms used and a brief description 
of each are given in Table 3.26.
The impacts of additional demand for first-generation biofuels on production, 
consumption and trade of agricultural commodities – particularly food staples – 
were evaluated by comparing the results of a range of biofuel expansion scenarios 
with a reference projection of the WFS simulated without imposing additional 
biofuel demand. Results of the reference projection are presented in the section 
on Baseline assessment.
The biofuel expansion scenarios analysed involved several simulation 
experiments related to two aspects:
table 3.26
biofuel scenarios analysed in this study
Acronym Description
FAO-REF-00 Starting in 1990, assumes a world with no agricultural crops used for biofuel 
production.
FAO-REF-01 Assumes historical biofuel development until 2008; biofuels feedstock demand kept 
constant after 2008; used as a reference simulation with which alternative biofuel 
scenarios are compared to identify their impacts.
WEO-V1 Assumes transport energy demand and regional biofuel use as projected by IEA 
in the WEO 2008 reference scenario. Second-generation conversion technologies 
become commercially available after 2015; deployment is gradual (Table 3.23)
WEO-V2 Assumes transport energy demand and regional biofuel use as projected by IEA in 
the WEO 2008 reference scenario. Assumes that delayed arrival of second-generation 
conversion technologies results in all biofuel production until 2030 being based on 
first-generation feedstocks.
TAR-V1 Assumes transport energy demand as projected by IEA in the WEO 2008 reference 
scenario. Assumes that mandatory, voluntary or indicative targets for biofuel use 
announced by major developed and developing countries will be implemented 
by 2020, resulting in about twice the biofuel consumption projected in WEO 2008. 
Second-generation conversion technologies become commercially available after 
2015; deployment is gradual (percentages as in WEO-V1).
TAR-V3 Assumes transport energy demand as projected by IEA in the WEO 2008 reference 
scenario. Assumes that mandatory, voluntary or indicative targets for biofuel use 
announced by major developed and developing countries will be implemented 
by 2020. Accelerated development of second-generation conversion technologies 
permits rapid deployment; 33% and 50% of biofuel use in developed countries from 
second-generation in 2020 and 2030 respectively.
SNS-V1, V2, 
V3, V4
Sensitivity scenarios assuming low (V1), intermediate (V2), high (V3) and very high 
(V4) shares of first-generation biofuels in total transport fuels (Table 3.24).
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• share of transport energy supplied from biofuels; 
• sensitivity of results to development speed of second-generation technologies.
As in climate change analysis, all exogenous variables, such as population 
growth, technical progress and growth of non-agricultural sectors, are left at the 
levels in the reference projection. No specific adjustment policies to counteract 
altered performance of agriculture are assumed beyond the farm-level adaptations 
resulting from economic adjustments by individual actors in the national models. 
The adjustment processes in the different scenarios are the outcome of the imposed 
additional biofuel demand causing changes in agricultural prices in international 
and national markets; these in turn affect investment allocation and labour 
migration among sectors and within agriculture. Time is an important aspect in 
this adjustment process.
Agricultural prices
As expected in a general equilibrium WFS model, when simulating scenarios 
with increased demand for food staples due to the production of first-generation 
biofuels, the resulting market imbalances at prevailing prices push international 
prices upwards.
Table 3.27 shows the results for selected scenarios: biofuel demand according 
to projections in scenario variants WEO-V1 and WEO-V2 (the latter assuming 
delayed introduction of second-generation technologies); and high biofuel 
consumption levels under scenario variants TAR-V1 and TAR-V3 (assuming 
accelerated introduction of second-generation biofuels).
table 3.27
impacts of biofuel expansion on agricultural prices
Scenario
Change in price index relative to reference scenario FAO-REF-01 (%)
Cereals Crops Agriculture
2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050
 WEO-V1 11 5 10 10 7 10 8 5 7
 WEO-V2 14 13 21 12 11 15 9 8 11
 TAR-V1 38 38 27 35 34 27 27 26 20
 TAR-V3 19 17 12 22 18 13 17 12 9
 SNS-V1 5 5 7 4 5 6 3 3 4
 SNS-V2 21 15 21 17 15 18 13 11 13
 SNS-V3 37 35 40 30 29 31 24 22 23
 SNS-V4 55 58 60 47 47 47 36 36 35
Sources: IIASA WFS simulations; FAO-REF-01 scenario, May 2009.
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For 2020, the price increases for both cereals and other crops under the WEO 
scenario are in the order of 10 percent. As the contribution of second-generation 
biofuels is still small in WEO-V1, the further delay assumed in WEO-V2 causes 
only moderate additional crop price increases. For biofuel demand specified in 
the TAR scenario (which is about twice that projected in the WEO scenario), 
the impact on crop prices in 2020 is fairly substantial, at about 35 percent. With 
accelerated introduction of cellulosic ethanol, as assumed in TAR-V3, the price 
impact on cereals is halved to about 19 percent.
For 2030, the pattern of price impacts remains similar to that of 2020. 
As second-generation biofuels gain importance towards 2030, the differences 
in price impacts between WEO-V1 and WEO-V2 become more visible. With 
accelerated deployment of second-generation fuels, even the large volumes of 
biofuels produced in TAR-V3 can be achieved with price increases of only about 
15 percent.
figure 3.5 
cereal price index compared with share of first-generation biofuels in transport 
fuels, 2020
SNS = sensitivity scenarios. 
TAR = scenario simulations based on mandates and indicative voluntary targets. 
WEO = simulations based on WEO 2008 projections of biofuel demand. 
REF = reference projections with constant, decreasing or no biofuel demand beyond 2008.
Source: IIASA WFS simulations, May 2009. 
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Summarizing these scenario experiments, it emerges that agricultural prices 
depend considerably on the aggregate share that first-generation biofuels are 
mandated to contribute to total transport fuel consumption. This is shown in 
Figure 3.5.
Cereal demand and production
The rising agricultural prices in the biofuel scenarios provide incentives on the 
supply side for intensifying production and augmenting and reallocating land, 
capital and labour. At the same time, consumers react to price increases and 
adjust their patterns of consumption. Figure 3.6 shows the producer responses in 
cereal sectors under different biofuel scenarios in 2020 and 2030, i.e., the amount 
of additional cereal production realized in each scenario compared with FAO-
REF-01.
In 2020, compared with 83 million tonnes in 2008 under the reference scenario, 
the additional global demand for cereal commodities for ethanol production 
is about 100 million tonnes in WEO-V1 and WEO-V2, 240 million tonnes in 
TAR-V1 and 155 million tonnes in scenario TAR-V3. Figure 3.6 highlights that 
the production increases in response to higher agricultural prices are greater in 
developed countries, as are the reductions in feed use (Figure 3.7). Regarding 
food use, however, consumption in developed countries is less responsive than 
in developing countries, which account for 75 percent of the forced reduction 
in cereal food consumption. Rising food commodity prices tend to have greater 
negative effects on lower-income than higher-income consumers. First, lower-
income consumers spend a larger share of their income on food, and second, 
staple food commodities such as maize, wheat, rice and soybeans account for 
a larger share of their food expenditure. Responses on the consumer side, with 
reduced food and feed use of cereals, are shown in Table 3.28.
table 3.28
impacts of biofuel expansion on cereal production and demand
Scenario
Change relative to reference scenario FAO-REF-00 (million tonnes) 
2020 2030 2050
Biofuel 
use
Produc-
tion
Food/
feed
Biofuel 
use
Produc-
tion
Food/
feed
Biofuel 
use
Produc-
tion
Food/
feed
 FAO-REF-00 83 64 -19 83 66 -17 83 68 -15
 WEO-V1 181 134 -46 206 167 -45 246 180 -62
 WEO-V2 192 140 -48 258 194 -68 376 271 -102
 TAR-V1 327 229 -96 437 308 -133 446 313 -127
 TAR-V3 238 174 -59 272 201 -69 262 198 -62
Sources: IIASA WFS simulations; FAO-REF-00 scenario, May 2009.
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figure 3.6 
changes in cereal production relative to baseline fao-ref-01
Source: IIASA WFS simulations, May 2009.
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figure 3.7 
changes in cereal use relative to baseline fao-ref-01, 2020
Source: IIASA world food system simulations, May 2009.
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Risk of hunger
The estimated number of people at risk of hunger used in the WFS model is based 
on FAO data (FAO, 2001; 2008b) and relies on a strong correlation between the 
share of undernourished in a country’s total population and the ratio of average 
per capita dietary food supply to average national per capita food requirements.
The model results show that an ambitious biofuel target for 2020, as specified 
in the TAR scenario, causes higher prices if achieved mainly by production of 
first-generation biofuels. This reduces food consumption in developing countries, 
which results in increased numbers of people at risk of hunger. Figure 3.8 compares 
results until 2050 for the baseline scenario FAO-REF-01 (with no climate change 
and no additional biofuel demand after 2008) with the estimated numbers of 
people at risk of hunger in the TAR-V3 scenario (implementing an ambitious 
global biofuel target with swift introduction of second-generation technologies).
While in FAO-REF-01 the number of undernourished people peaks in 
2009/2010 at somewhat more than 890 million and then declines to an estimated 
850 million in 2020, 700 million in 2030 and 460 million in 2050, this indicator 
stays at a high level in the TAR-V3 scenario until 2020, with about 940 million, 
and only then starts to decline as second-generation production begins to take 
pressure off the competing food, feed and biofuel feedstock markets.
Figure 3.9 presents the simulated regional distribution of additional 
undernourished people under different biofuel scenarios, showing a particularly 
large impact in South Asia. It is worth noting that even with relatively swift 
deployment of second-generation technologies, as assumed in TAR-V3, the 
results for 2020 show an increase of 80 million undernourished people.
box 3.1 - where do the cereals needed for biofuel production come from?
On average about two-thirds of the 
cereals used for ethanol production 
are obtained from additional crop 
production.
The remaining one-third comes from 
consumption changes. The reduction 
in direct cereal food consumption 
accounts for 10 percent of the amount 
of cereals used for biofuel production, 
reduced feed use accounts for about a 
quarter.
Increased
production
66%
Reduced
feed use
24%
Reduced
food use
10%
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figure 3.8 
people at risk of hunger, developing countries
Source: IIASA WFS simulations, May 2009.
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figure 3.9 
additional people at risk of hunger relative to baseline fao-ref-01
Source: IIASA WFS simulations, May 2009.
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The reference scenario FAO-REF-01 (keeping biofuels consumption constant 
after 2008) projects that the numbers of undernourished people in developing 
countries will be 850 million in 2020 and 700 million in 2050. The TAR scenario 
estimates that an additional 132 million people will be at risk of hunger in 2020 
and an additional 136 million in 2030. In the TAR scenario with accelerated 
second-generation biofuels deployment, the corresponding numbers of additional 
people at risk of hunger decrease to 85 million in 2020 and 74 million in 2030. 
Africa and South Asia account for more than two-thirds of these people across 
biofuel scenarios and in both 2020 and 2030.
Crop and livestock production value added
Biofuel development has been seen as a means to diversify agricultural production 
and – especially in developed economies – this has shaped agricultural support 
policies. This study considered the extent to which the additional production of 
crops as feedstocks for biofuel production will increase value added in agriculture. 
The percentage changes relative to the reference scenario FAO-REF-00, without 
any biofuels, are shown in Table 3.29.
Table 3.29 highlights that for all biofuel scenarios, agricultural value 
added increases at the global and regional levels, as expected. For instance, 
under WEO-V1 (with relatively modest biofuels development), the changes in 
absolute terms amount to USD 41 billion in 2020, USD 57 billion in 2030 and 
USD 71 billion in 2050, in 1990 dollars. Developed countries initially account for 
about 50 percent of the global gains in agricultural value added. As the relative 
weight of developed countries in global agriculture decreases over time, so does 
their share in global gains of agricultural value added, to reach an average of 45 
percent in 2050. Table 3.29 shows that agriculture sectors in developed countries also 
table 3.29
impacts of biofuel expansion on agricultural value added
Scenario
Change relative to reference scenario FAO-REF-00 (%)
World Developed countries Developing countries
2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050
 FAO-REF-01 1.2 1.2 0.9 2.4 2.9 2.0 0.8 0.7 0.6
 WEO-V1 2.5 3.1 3.2 4.3 6.3 5.8 1.8 1.9 2.4
 WEO-V2 2.5 3.5 4.0 4.4 7.4 7.8 1.8 2.1 2.9
 TAR-V1 4.4 6.6 7.1 6.9 12.1 11.4 3.4 4.4 5.7
 TAR-V3 3.7 4.9 4.5 5.7 8.9 7.3 2.9 3.3 3.7
Source: IIASA WFS simulations, May 2009.
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benefit more than those in developing countries in terms of percentage gains relative 
to the baseline. Under WEO-V1, the increase in 2020 is 4.3 percent for developed 
countries, compared with only about 1.8 percent for developing countries. While 
Africa and Latin America achieve gains of 2.4 and 3.1 percent, the gains achieved 
in the Near East and North Africa and in Asian regions are only 0.9 to 1.9 percent 
(Table 3.30).
In the TAR-V1 scenario, with a high demand for first-generation biofuels 
due to high national targets and only gradual introduction of second-generation 
technologies, agricultural value added increases substantially, by some 6.6 percent 
globally by 2030. Global agricultural value added increases by USD 73 billion in 
2020, USD 120 billion in 2030 and USD 155 billion in 2050, in 1990 dollars. Again, 
the percentage gains in TAR-V1 are higher for developed countries (averaging 
about 6.9 percent in 2020) than developing regions (3.4 percent), where estimated 
gains fall in a range of 1.7 to 5.7 percent. For developed countries, the TAR-V1 
scenario estimates the increases in agricultural value added (in 1990 dollars) 
resulting from biofuel development at USD 33 billion in 2020 and USD 62 billion 
in 2030. The corresponding values for developing countries are USD 37 billion in 
2020 and USD 51 billion in 2030.
table 3.30
impacts of biofuel expansion on regional agricultural value added
Region
Change in agricultural value added relative to reference scenario 
FAO-REF-00 (%)
WEO-V1 WEO-V2 TAR-V3
2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050
North America 8.5 11.2 8.6 8.7 13.2 12.8 11.6 14.1 8.6
Europe and Russian Federation 1.8 3.5 4.6 1.7 4.1 5.3 1.9 6.1 7.3
Pacific OECD 0.8 1.6 1.7 0.8 1.4 1.6 1.7 3.0 2.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.4 2.4 2.9 2.4 2.6 3.4 4.2 4.8 4.5
Latin America 3.1 3.5 5.2 3.1 3.8 6.4 4.9 5.7 7.8
Near East and North Africa 1.9 2.1 2.7 2.0 2.2 2.9 3.4 3.9 3.6
East Asia 0.9 1.1 1.2 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.7
South and Southeast Asia 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 2.6 2.8 2.3
Rest of world 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.4 0.5 2.6 3.0 2.4
Developed 4.3 6.3 5.8 4.4 7.4 7.8 5.7 8.9 7.3
Developing 1.8 1.9 2.4 1.8 2.1 2.9 2.9 3.3 3.7
World 2.5 3.1 3.2 2.5 3.5 4.0 3.7 4.9 4.5
Source: IIASA WFS simulations, May 2009.
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Impacts on the use of cultivated land
Discussion of the extent and kind of land required for biofuel production and of the 
impacts on cultivated land caused by expanding biofuel production distinguishes 
two elements: estimating direct land-use change from the extent of land used for 
producing biofuel feedstocks; and estimating the indirect land-use effects that 
can result from bioenergy production displacing services or commodities (food, 
fodder, fibre products) from arable land currently in production.
This study applies a general equilibrium framework that can capture both 
direct and indirect land-use changes by modelling the responses of consumers 
and producers to price changes induced by introducing competition with biofuel 
feedstock production. This approach accounts for land-use changes while also 
considering production intensification on existing agricultural land and consumer 
responses to changing availability and prices of agricultural commodities.
In a baseline projection without any use of agricultural feedstocks for biofuel 
production, as portrayed in the FAO-REF-00 scenario, the expansion of arable 
land to meet growing food and feed requirements between 2000 and 2020 amounts 
to about 80 million ha. Africa and Latin America, with projected increases in 
cultivated land of 39 and 33 million ha respectively, account for more than 85 
percent of total net arable land expansion.
Table 3.31 shows the additional use of cultivated land in 2020, 2030 and 2050 
in comparison with a scenario without any crop-based biofuels. For the WEO and 
TAR biofuel scenarios shown, this additional use in 2020 falls in the range of 
19 million ha (WEO-V1) to 38 million ha (TAR-V1). For developed countries, 
the arable land-use increases in different biofuel scenarios during 2000 to 2020 
are in the range of 6 to 12 million ha, compared with a net decrease of 3 million 
ha in a scenario without biofuels. In the baseline without biofuels (FAO-REF-00), 
table 3.31
impacts of biofuel expansion on cultivated land use
Scenario
Change in cultivated land relative to reference scenario FAO-REF-00 (%)
World Developed countries Developing countries
2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050
 FAO-REF-01 8 8 5 3 3 1 5 5 4
 WEO-V1 19 19 21 6 6 5 12 13 16
 WEO-V2 20 23 29 6 8 7 13 15 21
 TAR-V1 38 46 48 12 14 11 24 30 36
 TAR-V3 29 30 29 9 9 6 19 20 22
Sources: IIASA WFS simulations; FAO-REF-00 scenario, May 2009.
136
How can climate change and bioenergy alter the outlook for food and agriculture?
the increase in arable land use between 2000 and 2020 amounts to 87 million 
ha; for comparison, additional crop demand with biofuel development results in 
a total expansion of cultivated land use of 99 to 112 million ha, and additional 
use of 12 to 24 million ha. The difference of 24 million ha of arable land use 
in developing countries in the TAR-V1 scenario (compared with results without 
biofuel demand) is mainly explained by additional expansions of 9 million ha in 
sub-Saharan Africa and 11 million ha in South America.
When looking at differences in the expansion of cultivated land for the 
period 2000 to 2030, the range of estimates for biofuel scenarios widens further, 
from an additional 19 million ha (WEO-V1) to 46 million ha (TAR-V1).
Across the full range of simulated scenarios (including SNS scenarios), the 
use of cultivated land in 2020 ranges from 1 643 to 1 691 million ha, a difference 
of 48 million ha. In 2030, it ranges from 1 676 to 1 734 million ha, representing a 
maximum additional use of 58 million ha.
Increases of harvested area (Table 3.32) account for both the expansion of 
cultivated land and increased multicropping, i.e., the intensification of cropping on 
existing cultivated land. For the WEO and TAR biofuel scenarios this additional 
harvested area falls in the range of 26 million ha (WEO-V1) to 59 million ha 
(TAR-V1). Under different scenarios, the harvested area in developed countries 
increases by 10 to 18 million ha, and in developing countries by 17 to 35 million ha. 
While Africa and South America account for more than 80 percent of physical 
land expansion (additional cultivated land), their combined share in additional 
harvested area is only about 45 percent, which indicates that higher agricultural 
prices lead to a substantial intensification of cropping also in regions with limited 
land resources.
In summary, while total global arable land use is only 1 to 3 percent higher 
in biofuel scenarios than in a situation without biofuels, the impact becomes 
table 3.32
impacts of biofuel expansion on harvested area
Scenario
Change relative to reference scenario FAO-REF-00 (%)
World Developed countries Developing countries
2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050
 FAO-REF-01 13 15 8 6 7 2 7 8 6
 WEO-V1 29 33 31 10 13 6 19 20 25
 WEO-V2 30 39 43 10 15 8 20 24 34
 TAR-V1 57 74 71 17 23 12 38 49 57
 TAR-V3 45 50 42 14 17 7 30 32 35
Sources: IIASA WFS simulations; FAO-REF-00 scenario, May 2009.
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substantial when expressed in terms of net cultivated land expansion during 
2000 to 2020, 2000 to 2030, and 2000 to 2050. From this perspective, the impact 
of biofuel scenarios is to increase the net expansion of cultivated land by 20 to 
45 percent in 2000 to 2020, 15 to 40 percent in 2000 to 2030, and 12 to 30 percent 
in 2000 to 2050.
Second-generation biofuels
The previous section demonstrated that concerns about expanding the use of first-
generation biofuels, especially those derived from cereals and oilseeds, are well 
justified in view of their possible impacts on agricultural prices, food security and 
land use.
In this context, second-generation biofuels, produced from woody or 
herbaceous non-food plant materials as feedstocks, have attracted great attention 
and raised hopes that the substantial technological and economic barriers that still 
hamper the commercial deployment of second-generation technologies can soon 
be resolved, to allow their use and full commercialization in the near future.
Some of the problems associated with first-generation biofuels can be 
avoided by the production of biofuels using agricultural and forest residues and 
non-food crop feedstocks. First, the energy yields per hectare achievable with 
second-generation feedstocks are generally higher than those of first-generation 
biofuels; and second, land of different quality could possibly be used for their 
production, thus limiting or avoiding land-use competition with food production, as 
lignocellulosic feedstocks are expected to be grown mainly outside cultivated land.
Following recent substantial government grants for the development of 
second-generation feedstocks and conversion technologies, and based on the 
announced plans of companies developing second-generation biofuel facilities, an 
optimistic view is that fully commercial-scale operations could possibly be seen 
as early as 2012. However, with the complexity of the technical and economic 
challenges involved, a more realistic expectation is that wide deployment of 
commercial plants is unlikely to begin before 2015 or 2020. Therefore it is still 
uncertain what contribution second-generation biofuels will make to meeting the 
global transport fuel demand by 2030 (IEA, 2008a).
Uncertainties have been included in the scenario analysis by simulating the 
outcomes for a range of assumptions about the expected share of biofuels that will 
be contributed by second-generation fuels (Table 3.33).
A recent report published by IEA states that both principal conversion 
processes – bio-geochemical conversion of cellulose to ethanol and thermo-
chemical conversion to FT-diesel – can potentially convert 1 dry tonne of biomass 
(with about 20 GJ/tonne energy content) to about 6.5 GJ of energy in the form 
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of biofuels, representing an overall biomass-to-biofuel conversion efficiency of 
about 35 percent (IEA, 2008a). Ranges of indicative biofuel yields per dry tonne 
of biomass are shown in Table 3.34.
Assuming that average biochemical ethanol yields of 250 litres per dry tonne 
of biomass will be achievable in 2020 and 300 litres in 2030, and that thermo-
chemical FT-diesel conversion will produce 160 litres per dry tonne of biomass 
in 2020 and 200 litres in 2030, each tonne of oil equivalent of second-generation 
table 3.33
Shares and total amounts of second-generation biofuels
Scenario
Share in total transport biofuels (%) Use (million TOE)
2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050
Global average
WEO-V1 3 13 30 3 17 62
WEO-V2 0 0 10 0 0 21
WEO-V3 13 30 49 13 38 103
TAR-V1 2 12 26 5 37 110
TAR-V2 0 0 10 0 0 42
TAR-V3 22 38 55 41 113 234
Developed countries
WEO-V1 4 19 40 3 15 50
WEO-V2 0 0 10 0 0 12
WEO-V3 18 36 59 11 29 73
TAR-V1 4 18 39 5 32 84
TAR-V2 0 0 10 0 0 21
TAR-V3 33 51 68 39 91 146
Source: Fischer et al., 2009.
table 3.34
indicative biofuel yields of second-generation conversion technologies
Process
Biofuel yield
(litres/dry tonne)
Energy 
content 
(MJ/litre)
Energy yield
(GJ/dry tonne)
Biomass input
(dry tonne/TOE)
Low High LHV Low High Low High
Biochemical enzymatic
   hydrolysis ethanol
110 300 21.1 2.3 6.3 18.0 6.6
Thermo-chemical
   FT-diesel 75 200 34.4 2.6 6.9 16.2 6.1
Syngas-to-ethanol 120 160 21.1 2.5 3.4 16.5 12.4
Source: IEA, 2008a.
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biofuels will require an average of 7.7 dry tonnes of biomass in 2020, 6.4 dry 
tonnes by 2030, and 6 dry tonnes in 2050. This results in the biomass demands for 
second-generation biofuels shown in Table 3.35.
Rapid deployment of second-generation conversion technologies after 2015 to 
meet the biofuel production of the TAR-V3 scenario in 2020 and 2030 would require 
some 315 million dry tonnes of biomass in 2020, increasing to 725 million dry tonnes 
in 2030. Of these, about 300 million dry tonnes in 2020 and nearly 600 million dry 
tonnes in 2030 would be required to meet the demand in developed countries.
Land required for second-generation biofuels
Low-cost crop and forest residues, wood process wastes and the organic fraction 
of municipal solid wastes can all be used as lignocellulosic feedstocks. In some 
regions, substantial volumes of these materials are available and may be used. In 
such cases, the production of biofuels requires well-designed logistics systems but 
no additional land. In other regions, with limited residues and suitable wastes and 
where large and growing amounts of feedstocks are demanded, additional land 
will be needed for plantations of perennial energy grasses or short-rotation forest 
crops. Typical yields for the most important suitable feedstocks are summarized 
in Table 3.36.
Taking an average typical yield of about 10 dry tonnes per hectare as possible 
and reasonable in 2020, the biomass requirements listed in Table 3.35, with a 
maximum of 315 million dry tonnes in 2020, imply that up to 32 million ha of 
land will be needed if all biomass is to come from plantations. In reality, the 
land requirement in 2020 will be much lower, owing to the availability of large 
amounts of cheap crop and forest residues. In this early stage of second-generation 
biofuel development, most of the biomass will be required in developed countries. 
table 3.35
biomass demand for second-generation biofuels
Scenario
Global demand Demand in developed countries
(million dry tonnes)
2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050
WEO-V1 19 106 370 19 95 300
WEO-V2 0 0 125 0 0 74
WEO-V3 97 240 615 87 186 440
TAR-V1 35 234 660 35 207 500
TAR-V2 0 0 254 0 0 128
TAR-V3 315 725 1 402 297 583 875
Source: Fischer et al., 2009.
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By 2030, assuming that research and experience increase average yields to about 
15 dry tonnes per hectare (as suggested in Table 3.36), the upper limits of land 
required for feedstock production will be 50 million ha in the TAR-V3 scenario 
and less than 20 million ha in both the WEO-V3 and the TAR-V1 scenarios.
While the conventional agricultural feedstocks currently used in first-
generation biofuel production compete with food crops, second-generation 
lignocellulose technologies promise substantial greenhouse gas savings and 
may allow the use of land resources currently not or only extensively used. 
Acknowledging these significant advantages of second-generation lignocellulosic 
biofuel feedstocks over conventional agricultural feedstocks, the study employed a 
detailed geographical resource database (Fischer et al., 2008) to estimate the land 
potentially available for bioenergy production under a food and environment first 
paradigm, i.e., excluding land currently used for food and feed production, as well 
as forests.
This estimation was based on a 5′ by 5′ latitude/longitude grid (of about 
10 km by 10 km at the equator). It started from total land area and subtracted all 
land indicated as artificial and built-up surfaces, all cultivated land and current 
forest land. The next step was to exclude all areas indicated or designated as legally 
protected, and then land with very low productivity owing to cold temperatures at 
high latitudes or altitudes, low annual precipitation, or steep sloping conditions. 
Starting with a total global land area of 13.2 billion ha (excluding Antarctica 
and Greenland) and subtracting all current cultivated land, forests, built-up land, 
water bodies and non-vegetated land (desert, rocks, etc.) resulted in 4.6 billion ha 
of land remaining (about 35 percent of the total). When unproductive, marginally 
productive (e.g., tundra, arid land) and steeply sloped land was excluded, the 
remaining area was estimated at 1.75 billion ha (Table 3.37), comprising grassland 
and woodland. 
table 3.36
typical yields of second-generation biofuel feedstocksa
Feedstock
Current yields Expected yield by 2030
(dry tonnes/ha)
Miscanthus 10 20
Switchgrass 12 16
Short-rotation willow 10 15
Short-rotation poplar 9 13
a These yields refer to generally good land; under marginal conditions, yields can 
be substantially lower.
Source: Worldwatch Institute, 2007.
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More than two-thirds of this grassland and woodland potentially suitable 
for biofuel feedstock production is located in developing countries, especially in 
Africa and South America (Table 3.37). These estimates are indicative only and are 
subject to the limitations and accuracy of global land cover, soil and terrain data.
An important current use of these land resources is livestock grazing. Based 
on UN FAOSTAT data on feed utilization of crops and processed crop products 
(e.g., oilseed cakes and meals), fodder crop production, national livestock 
numbers and livestock production, the feed energy provided by each source was 
estimated for each country to determine the energy gap to be filled by grassland 
and pastures. The results of detailed livestock feed energy balances suggest that in 
2000 about 55 to 60 percent of available grassland biomass globally was required 
for animal feeding. The shares are about 40 percent in developed countries and an 
average 65 percent for developing countries, ranging from more than 80 percent 
in Asian regions to about 50 percent in sub-Saharan Africa.
Hence, at current use levels, the land potentially available for bioenergy 
production (assuming unbiased distribution between livestock feeding and 
bioenergy uses) was estimated at about 700 to 800 million ha, characterized by a 
table 3.37
regional balance of land classified as unprotected grassland and woodland 
potentially usable for rainfed lignocellulosic biofuel feedstock production
Region
Total 
grassland 
and 
woodland 
(million ha)
Of which (million ha) Potential rainfed yield (dry tonnes/ha)
Protected 
areas
Unproductive 
or marginally 
productive Balance 
Average 
yield Low yield High yield
North 
America 659 103 391 165 9.3 6.7 21.4
Europe and 
Russian 
Federation
902 76 618 208 7.7 6.9 14.5
Pacific OECD 515 7 332 175 9.8 6.5 20.0
Africa 1 086 146 386 554 13.9 6.7 21.1
East Asia 379 66 254 60 8.9 6.4 19.0
South Asia 177 26 81 71 16.7 7.6 21.5
Latin America 765 54 211 500 15.6 7.1 21.8
Near East and 
North Africa 107 2 93 12 6.9 6.3 10.6
Developed 2 076 186 1 342 548 8.9 6.7 21.0
Developing 2 530 295 1 029 1 206 14.5 6.8 21.5
World 4 605 481 2 371 1 754 12.5 6.8 21.5
Source: Fischer et al., 2008.
142
How can climate change and bioenergy alter the outlook for food and agriculture?
rather wide range of productivity levels. Of this, an estimated 330 million ha is in 
developed countries: about one-third each in North America; Europe, the Russian 
Federation and Central Asian republics; and Pacific OECD. About 450 million 
ha is in developing countries: 275 million ha in Africa and 160 million ha in 
Latin America. Regional details of the estimated land areas and potential yields of 
second-generation lignocellulosic feedstocks are presented in Table 3.37.
Only the demand for livestock feeding was subtracted, as it is currently the 
main alternative use. No allowances were included for other social or environmental 
land functions, such as providing a feed source for wildlife. Estimates are also 
subject to uncertainties regarding grass and pasture yields, which – owing to the 
scarcity of data – had to be estimated in model simulations with the IIASA/FAO 
Global AEZ Study (GAEZ) model (Fischer et al., 2008).
It can be concluded that land demand for producing second-generation 
feedstocks as required for the most demanding TAR-V3 scenario in 2020 (about 
30 million ha) and 2030 (about 50 million ha) could be met without having to 
compete for cultivated land. The results of the TAR scenario with accelerated 
second-generation biofuel deployment indicate that production of lignocellulosic 
feedstocks on some 100 million ha would be sufficient to achieve the target 
biofuel share in world transport fuels in 2050.
However, there is still need to assess and respect the current uses and 
functions of potentially suitable land and to regulate land use in an integrated 
approach across sectors, to achieve land-use efficiency, avoid conflicts and protect 
the rights of the weakest members of society when landownership is uncertain. 
Another major challenge is developing the massive infrastructure and logistics 
systems required for second-generation feedstock supply systems.
Combined impacts of climate change and expansion of biofuel production 
on world food system indicators
The previous sections reviewed the individual impacts of climate change and the 
expansion of biofuel production on world food system indicators. This section 
summarizes the results for the combined impacts of both factors, by comparing 
scenario outcomes with a reference simulation assuming current climate conditions 
and no use of crops for transport biofuel production.
Agricultural prices
Table 3.38 presents the results of scenario analysis and the deviations of price 
indices for cereals, all crops and agriculture (all crop and livestock sectors), 
for a selection of scenarios constructed by combining different climate change 
projections and assumptions concerning CO2 fertilization with a range of biofuel 
expansion scenarios.
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table 3.38
combined impacts of climate change and biofuel expansion on agricultural prices
Scenario
CO2 
fertilization
Change in price index relative to reference scenario FAO-REF-00 (%)
2020 2030 2050 2080
Cereals
Hadley A2, FAO-REF-01 with 4 5 5 28
Hadley A2, WEO-V1 with 15 13 16 42
Hadley A2, WEO-V2 with 18 18 26 49
Hadley A2, TAR-V1 with 42 41 36 61
Hadley A2, TAR-V3 with 23 20 16 43
CSIRO A2, REF-01 with 9 10 10 28
CSIRO A2, WEO-V1 with 22 17 20 43
CSIRO A2, WEO-V2 with 24 23 30 49
CSIRO A2, TAR-V1 with 49 49 40 61
CSIRO A2, TAR-V3 with 29 26 20 45
Hadley A2, REF-01 without 10 13 16 52
Hadley A2, WEO-V1 without 20 21 30 68
Hadley A2, WEO-V2 without 24 26 42 79
Hadley A2, TAR-V1 without 49 54 53 87
Hadley A2, TAR-V3 without 25 29 31 70
Crops
Hadley A2, REF-01 with 2 3 2 15
Hadley A2, WEO-V1 with 13 11 12 25
Hadley A2, WEO-V2 with 14 13 17 28
Hadley A2, TAR-V1 with 36 35 31 41
Hadley A2, TAR-V3 with 24 19 15 28
CSIRO A2, REF-01 with 6 6 5 14
CSIRO A2, WEO-V1 with 17 13 15 24
CSIRO A2, WEO-V2 with 18 16 20 27
CSIRO A2, TAR-V1 with 42 40 34 40
CSIRO A2, TAR-V3 with 28 23 18 27
Hadley A2, REF-01 without 7 9 12 33
Hadley A2, WEO-V1 without 17 18 24 44
Hadley A2, WEO-V2 without 19 20 30 48
Hadley A2, TAR-V1 without 44 45 45 61
Hadley A2, TAR-V3 without 28 28 27 48
Agriculture
Hadley A2, REF-01 with 1 2 1 11
Hadley A2, WEO-V1 with 9 7 8 17
Hadley A2, WEO-V2 with 10 9 12 19
Hadley A2, TAR-V1 with 27 25 22 27
Hadley A2, TAR-V3 with 17 13 10 19
CSIRO A2, REF-01 with 4 4 4 10
CSIRO A2, WEO-V1 with 13 9 11 17
CSIRO A2, WEO-V2 with 13 12 15 19
CSIRO A2, TAR-V1 with 32 30 24 27
CSIRO A2, TAR-V3 with 21 17 12 18
Hadley A2, REF-01 without 5 7 9 23
Hadley A2, WEO-V1 without 13 13 17 31
Hadley A2, WEO-V2 without 14 15 22 34
Hadley A2, TAR-V1 without 33 33 33 42
Hadley A2, TAR-V3 without 20 20 19 33
Sources: IIASA WFS simulations; reference scenario FAO-REF-00, May 2009.
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Comparing these results with outcomes in Table 3.15 (climate change 
impacts) and Table 3.27 (biofuel expansion impacts) indicates that the effects of 
both factors will combine to increase agricultural prices. For the next few decades, 
the most important scenario factor in determining price increases is the scale of 
crop use as biofuel feedstocks. In the medium and long terms, climate change 
becomes the overriding factor.
Taking the effects of CO2 fertilization on crop yields into account, the 
simulated cereal price increases for the presented scenario combinations up 
to 2050 range from 15 to 40 percent when using the HadCM3 climate model 
outputs, and are somewhat higher when applying climate scenarios based on the 
CSIRO GCM. Without CO2 fertilization effects, the cereal price increases for the 
decades up to 2050 range from 20 to 55 percent. Simulation results for the 2080s, 
when climate change impacts seriously affect crop yields, the calculated cereal 
price increases range from 40 to 60 percent with CO2 fertilization and from 70 to 
90 percent without CO2 fertilization.
Cereal production and consumption
Table 3.39 lists the scenario results regarding production increases relative to the 
baseline scenario FAO-REF-00 (without climate change and with no crop use for 
biofuel production).
table 3.39
combined impacts of climate change and biofuel expansion on cereal production
Scenario
CO2 
fertilization
Change relative to reference scenario FAO-REF-00 (million tonnes)
2020 2030 2050 2080
 Hadley A2, REF-01 with 70 65 54 -26
 Hadley A2, WEO-V1 with 148 160 184 122
 Hadley A2, WEO-V2 with 149 197 273 219
 Hadley A2, TAR-V1 with 237 320 311 278
 Hadley A2, TAR-V3 with 181 209 198 142
 CSIRO A2, REF-01 with 55 48 31 -16
 CSIRO A2, WEO-V1 with 126 146 161 126
 CSIRO A2, WEO-V2 with 133 180 250 228
 CSIRO A2, TAR-V1 with 222 299 291 291
 CSIRO A2, TAR-V3 with 165 190 177 151
 Hadley A2, REF-01 without 56 45 16 -98
 Hadley A2, WEO-V1 without 135 138 139 41
 Hadley A2, WEO-V2 without 137 176 224 144
 Hadley A2, TAR-V1 without 223 294 266 193
 Hadley A2, TAR-V3 without 179 183 153 66
Sources: IIASA WFS simulations; FAO-REF-00 scenario, May 2009.
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Comparing these scenario results with the information in Table 3.40 indicates 
that up to 2050 there is relatively little climate change impact on aggregate cereal 
supply and consumption under the HadCM3 scenario with CO2 fertilization; 
with CSIRO GCM-derived climate change impacts, the shortfall in consumption 
increases by about 20 million tonnes compared with biofuels only. Without CO2 
fertilization effects on crop yields, the decrease in consumption for HadCM3 in 
2030 is 68 to 148 million tonnes, of which about 25 million tonnes is due to climate 
change. In 2050, the consumption reduction is in the range of 104 to 174 million 
tonnes, of which about 50 million tonnes is caused by climate change. In the long 
term, looking at results for 2080, climate change accounts for up to two-thirds of 
the reduction in cereal consumption in scenarios with CO2 fertilization and for up 
to 85 percent in the HadCM3 scenario without CO2 fertilization.
Risk of hunger
Combined scenario results regarding the number of people at risk of hunger are 
shown in Table 3.41. Results are consistent with the previous discussion on price 
changes and cereal consumption impacts. Again, the conditions portrayed by the 
FAO reference projections (FAO, 2006) imply a vast improvement in reducing 
table 3.40
combined impacts of climate change and biofuel expansion on cereal consumption 
(excluding biofuel use) 
Scenario
CO2 fertilization
Change (excluding biofuel feedstocks) relative to reference 
scenario FAO-REF-00 (million tonnes)
2020 2030 2050 2080
 Hadley A2, REF-01 with -10 -21 -25 -100
 Hadley A2, WEO-V1 with -33 -47 -60 -117
 Hadley A2, WEO-V2 with -43 -63 -99 -144
 Hadley A2, TAR-V1 with -88 -122 -128 -156
 Hadley A2, TAR-V3 with -53 -65 -61 -111
 CSIRO A2, REF-01 with -24 -38 -43 -92
 CSIRO A2, WEO-V1 with -51 -60 -78 -111
 CSIRO A2, WEO-V2 with -57 -78 -118 -133
 CSIRO A2, TAR-V1 with -102 -142 -149 -144
 CSIRO A2, TAR-V3 with -66 -83 -80 -104
 Hadley A2, REF-01 without -24 -41 -63 -170
 Hadley A2, WEO-V1 without -49 -68 -104 -191
 Hadley A2, WEO-V2 without -57 -82 -144 -221
 Hadley A2, TAR-V1 without -102 -148 -174 -232
 Hadley A2, TAR-V3 without -60 -86 -105 -183
Sources: IIASA WFS simulations; FAO-REF-00 scenario, May 2009.
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undernourishment. Therefore, relative changes compared with the baseline FAO-
REF-00 are large in 2050 and 2080 but relatively small in absolute terms.
Cultivated land
Tables 3.42 and 3.43 present the combined impacts of climate change and biofuel 
expansion scenarios on cultivated land use. Summarizing over all the scenarios 
shown in Table 3.42, the additional use of cultivated land falls by 16 to 40 million 
ha in 2020, 17 to 49 million ha in 2030, and 20 to 58 million ha in 2050.
For harvested area, shown in Table 3.43, the additional use ranges from 24 to 
59 million ha in 2020, 28 to 78 million ha in 2030, and 28 to 85 million ha in 2050.
Conclusions
This paper reports on a large number of scenario experiments conducted to 
improve the understanding of how climate change and expanding bioenergy use 
may alter the long-term outlook for food, agriculture and resource availability.
IIASA’s global and spatial agro-ecological and socio-economic assessment 
framework provided the analytical means and science-based knowledge for the 
assessment. The following is a summary of the main conclusions and implications 
derived from the global quantitative analysis:
table 3.41
combined impacts of climate change and biofuel expansion on risk of 
hunger indicator
Scenario
CO2 
fertilization
Change in number of people at risk of hunger relative 
to reference scenario FAO-REF-00 (million people)
2020 2030 2050 2080
 Hadley A2, REF-01 with 6 9 2 29
 Hadley A2, WEO-V1 with 51 41 34 39
 Hadley A2, WEO-V2 with 59 54 54 43
 Hadley A2, TAR-V1 with 150 148 99 55
 Hadley A2, TAR-V3 with 100 82 39 40
 CSIRO A2, REF-01 with 14 23 4 21
 CSIRO A2, WEO-V1 with 14 23 4 32
 CSIRO A2, WEO-V2 with 82 75 60 35
 CSIRO A2, TAR-V1 with 178 176 104 48
 CSIRO A2, TAR-V3 with 123 108 46 32
 Hadley A2, REF-01 without 33 43 41 58
 Hadley A2, WEO-V1 without 75 76 78 70
 Hadley A2, WEO-V2 without 85 88 102 77
 Hadley A2, TAR-V1 without 179 192 153 87
 Hadley A2, TAR-V3 without 117 119 88 72
Sources: IIASA WFS simulations; FAO-REF-00 scenario, May 2009.
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table 3.42
combined impacts of climate change and biofuel expansion on use of cultivated land
Scenario
CO2 
fertilization
Change relative to reference scenario FAO-REF-00 (million ha)
2020 2030 2050 2080
 Hadley A2, REF-01 with 4 5 3 16
 Hadley A2, WEO-V1 with 16 17 20 33
 Hadley A2, WEO-V2 with 17 20 26 39
 Hadley A2, TAR-V1 with 35 43 47 59
 Hadley A2, TAR-V3 with 26 27 27 39
 CSIRO A2, REF-01 with 8 11 10 20
 CSIRO A2, WEO-V1 with 20 21 26 37
 CSIRO A2, WEO-V2 with 21 25 33 43
 CSIRO A2, TAR-V1 with 40 48 53 63
 CSIRO A2, TAR-V3 with 30 33 33 44
 Hadley A2, REF-01 without 8 12 14 33
 Hadley A2, WEO-V1 without 19 22 31 50
 Hadley A2, WEO-V2 without 20 25 37 56
 Hadley A2, TAR-V1 without 39 49 58 75
 Hadley A2, TAR-V3 without 29 33 38 57
Sources: IIASA WFS simulations; FAO-REF-00 scenario, May 2009.
table 3.43 
combined impacts of climate change and biofuel expansion on harvested area
Scenario
CO2 
fertilization
Change relative to reference scenario FAO-REF-00 (million ha)
2020 2030 2050 2080
 Hadley A2, REF-01 with 7 9 3 22
 Hadley A2, WEO-V1 with 24 28 28 47
 Hadley A2, WEO-V2 with 25 33 38 56
 Hadley A2, TAR-V1 with 51 68 67 86
 Hadley A2, TAR-V3 with 39 45 38 56
 CSIRO A2, REF-01 with 13 17 11 24
 CSIRO A2, WEO-V1 with 30 36 34 50
 CSIRO A2, WEO-V2 with 31 41 45 58
 CSIRO A2, TAR-V1 with 58 75 74 89
 CSIRO A2, TAR-V3 with 46 52 45 60
 Hadley A2, REF-01 without 14 19 20 49
 Hadley A2, WEO-V1 without 30 38 46 75
 Hadley A2, WEO-V2 without 32 43 56 84
 Hadley A2, TAR-V1 without 59 78 85 112
 Hadley A2, TAR-V3 without 45 55 56 85
Sources: IIASA WFS simulations; FAO-REF-00 scenario, May 2009.
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• At the global aggregate level, climate change projected by different GCMs 
causes only modest changes to world food system indicators (prices, cereal 
production, food consumption, cultivated land use) in the period up to 2050.
• These findings assume full agronomic adaptation by farmers and do not 
take into account climate variability, which is expected to increase over 
the coming decades and may be an important destabilizing factor in the 
short to medium term.
• The capacity to adapt to climate change impacts is strongly linked to 
future development paths. The socio-economic and, even more so, the 
technological characteristics of different development futures strongly 
affect societies’ capability to adapt to and mitigate climate change.
• Assumptions regarding yield increases due to increased atmospheric 
CO2 concentrations (the CO2 fertilization effect) play an important role 
in scenario outcomes. When disregarding these effects, negative climate 
change impacts on crop yields and world food system indicators become 
noticeable even in the short term, and are very substantial in the medium 
and long terms.
• Scenario results confirm that, with and without CO2 fertilization, the 
impacts of climate change on crop yields and production could become 
severe in the second half of this century.
• If expansion of biofuel production continues to rely mainly on agricultural 
crops, and if expansion follows the pace projected by IEA in 2008 or 
achieves the levels implied by mandates and targets set in many countries, 
this additional non-food use of crops will have a significant impact on the 
world food system.
• While biofuels could have an especially large impact in the period up to 
2030, the aggregate impact on the food system is likely to decrease over 
time. The opposite is to be expected for climate change impacts.
• For the range of scenarios analysed in this assessment, the combined 
impact of climate change and biofuel expansion on aggregate crop 
prices is in the range of a 10 to 45 percent increase. Decrease of cereal 
consumption typically falls initially within 35 to 100 million tonnes, 
increasing to a range of 60 to 150 million tonnes by 2050. Regarding 
cultivated land, additional use in the range of 20 to 50 million ha by 2030 
and 25 to 60 million ha in 2050 can be expected.
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tHe modelling framework
The study is based on a state-of-the-art ecological-economic modelling approach. The 
scenario-based quantified findings of the study rely on a modelling framework that 
includes the FAO/IIASA Agro-Ecological Zone (AEZ) model and the IIASA World 
Food System (WFS) model as components. The modelling framework encompasses 
climate scenarios, agro-ecological zoning information, demographic and socio-
economic drivers, and production, consumption and world food trade dynamics.
AEZ methodology
The AEZ modelling uses detailed agronomic-based knowledge to simulate land 
resources availability, assess farm-level management options and estimate crop 
production potentials. It employs detailed spatial biophysical and socio-economic 
datasets to distribute its computations at fine-gridded intervals over the entire 
globe (Fischer et al., 2002; 2005). This land resources inventory is used to assess, 
for specified management conditions and levels of inputs, the suitability of crops 
under both rainfed and irrigated conditions, and to quantify expected attainable 
production levels of cropping activities relevant to specific agro-ecological 
contexts. The characterization of land resources includes components of climate, 
soils, land form and current land cover. Crop modelling and environmental 
matching procedures are used to identify crop-specific environmental limitations 
under various levels of inputs and management conditions.
In summary, the AEZ framework contains the following basic elements:
• land resources database, containing geo-referenced climate, soil and 
terrain data;
• land utilization types (LUTs) database of agricultural production systems, 
describing crop-specific environmental requirements and adaptability 
characteristics, including input levels and management;
• mathematical procedures for matching crop LUT requirements with agro-
ecological zones data and estimating potentially attainable crop yields, by 
land unit and grid-cell; the AEZ global assessment includes 2.2 million 
land grid cells at 5′ by 5′ latitude/longitude;
• assessments of crop suitability and land productivity;
• applications for agricultural development planning.
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WFS model
The WFS model comprises a series of national and regional agricultural economic 
models. It provides a framework for analysing the world food system and for 
viewing national food and agricultural components as embedded in national 
economies and interacting with each other at the international trade level. The 
model consists of 34 national and regional geographical components covering 
the world. The individual national/regional models are linked by means of a 
world market, where international clearing prices are computed to equalize global 
demand with supply (Box A3.1).
 Simulations with the WFS model generate a variety of outputs. At the global 
level, these include world market prices, global population, global production and 
global consumption. At the country level, they include producer and retail prices, 
levels of production, use of primary production factors (land, labour and capital), 
intermediate input use (feed and fertilizer), human consumption, use for biofuel 
production, commodity trade, value added in agriculture, investment by sector 
and income by group and/or sector.
 Population growth and technology are key external inputs to the WFS 
model system. Population numbers and projected incomes are used to determine 
the demand for food for the period of study. Technology affects yield estimates, 
by modifying the efficiency of production per given units of inputs and land. For 
simulations of historical periods up to the present, population data are taken from 
official UN country-level data, while the rate of technical progress is estimated 
from past agricultural performance.
 To assess agricultural development over the next decades to 2050, it 
was necessary first to make some coherent assumptions about how key socio-
economic drivers of food systems might evolve over that period. For the analysis 
reported in this chapter, population projections were taken from the UN database 
for world population prospects (UN, 2009). Economic growth of countries and 
regional groups in the WFS model were calibrated according to information 
provided by the World Agriculture Towards 2030/2050 study group at FAO 
(J. Bruinsma, 2009, personal communication).
 Another external input to the WFS model system is projected climate 
change, which affects region-specific crop suitability and attainable yields. The 
economic model uses this spatial agronomic information (derived from AEZ) in 
an aggregate form as an input in allocating land and agricultural inputs (Fischer et 
al., 2005). In this study, results of the coupled atmosphere-ocean GCM developed 
by the United Kingdom’s Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction and Research and 
Australia’s CSIRO were used to take into account climate change impacts on land 
suitability and productivity (Fischer, Shah and van Velthuizen, 2002).
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box a3.1 - How does the world food system work?
The WFS model is an applied general equilibrium model system. While focusing on 
agriculture, this necessitates that all other economic activities are also represented in the 
model. Financial and commodity flows within a country and at the international level are kept 
consistent in that they must balance, by imposing a system of budget constraints and market 
clearing conditions. Whatever is produced will be demanded, for human consumption, feed, 
biofuel use or as an intermediate input. Alternatively, commodities can be exported or put 
into storage. Consistency of financial flows is imposed at the level of the economic agents in 
the model (individual income groups, governments, etc.), nationally and internationally. This 
implies that total expenditures cannot exceed total income from economic activities and 
from abroad, in the form of financial transfers, minus savings. On a global scale, no more can 
be spent than what is earned.
Each individual model component focuses primarily on the agriculture sector, but also 
includes a simple representation of the entire economy, which is necessary for capturing 
essential dynamics among capital, labour and land. For the purpose of international linkage, 
production, consumption and trade of goods and services are aggregated into nine main 
agricultural sectors: wheat; rice; coarse grains; bovine and ovine meat; dairy products; other 
meat and fish; oilseed cakes and protein meals; other food; and non-food agriculture. The 
rest of the economy is coarsely aggregated into one simplified non-agricultural sector. 
In the model, agricultural commodities may be used for human consumption, feed, 
biofuel feedstock, intermediate consumption and stock accumulation. Non-agricultural 
commodities also contribute as investment and as inputs for processing and transporting 
agricultural goods. All physical and financial accounts are balanced and mutually consistent: 
production, consumption and financial accounts at the national level; and trade and financial 
flows at the global level.
Linkage of country and country group models occurs through trade, world market prices and 
financial flows. The system is solved in annual increments, simultaneously for all countries 
in each period. Within each one-year period, demand changes with price, and commodity 
buffer stocks can be adjusted for short-term supply response. Production in the following 
marketing year is affected by changes in relative prices (owing to time lags in the agricultural 
production cycle). This feature makes the WFS model a recursively dynamic system.
The market clearing process results in equilibrium prices, i.e., a vector of international prices 
such that global imports and exports balance for all commodities. These market clearing 
prices are then used to determine value added in the production and income of households 
and governments.
Within each regional unit, the supply modules allocate land, labour and capital as functions 
of the relative profitability of the different crop and livestock sectors. In particular, actual 
cultivated area is computed from both agro-climatic land parameters (derived from AEZ) 
and profitability estimates. Once area, labour and capital are assigned to cropping and 
livestock activities, yields and livestock production are computed as a function of fertilizer 
applications, feed rates and available technology.
The IIASA WFS model has been calibrated and validated over past time windows, and 
reproduces regional consumption, production and trade of major agricultural commodities 
in 2000. Several applications of the model to agricultural policy and climate change impact 
analysis have been published (e.g., Fischer et al., 1988; 1994; Rosenzweig and Parry, 1994; 
Fischer, Shah and van Velthuizen, 2002; Fischer et al., 2005; Tubiello and Fischer, 2006).
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aggregation of world food SyStem componentS to world regionS
 
Aggregate regional country group models
African oil exporters: Algeria, Angola, Congo, Gabon.
Af rica medium-income/food exporters: Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Cameroon, 
Mauritius, Zimbabwe.
Af rica medium-income/food importers: Morocco, Tunisia, Liberia, Mauritania, 
Zambia.
economic group region wfS component
Developed North America Canada, United States
Europe and Russian Federation Austria, EU9, Eastern Europe, former Soviet 
Union, Turkey
Pacific OECD Australia, Japan, New Zealand
Developing Sub-Saharan Africa Kenya, Nigeria
Africa oil exporters
Africa medium-income/food exporters
Africa low-income/food exporters
Africa low-income/food importers
Latin America Argentina, Brazil, Mexico
Latin America high-income/food exporters
Latin America high-income/food importers
Latin America medium-income
Near East and North Africa Egypt
Africa medium-income/food importers
Near/Middle East oil exporters
Near/Middle East medium- and low-income 
countries.
East Asia China
Far East Asia high- and medium-income/food 
importers
South and Southeast Asia India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand
Asia low-income countries
Far East Asia high- and medium-income/food 
exporters
Rest of the world Rest of the world Rest of the world 
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Af rica low-income/food exporters: Benin, the Gambia, Togo, Ethiopia, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Uganda, the Sudan.
Af rica low-income/food importers: Guinea, Mali, the Niger, Sierra Leone, 
Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Burundi, Madagascar, Rwanda, Somalia, United Republic of Tanzania. 
La tin America high-income/food exporters: Costa Rica, Panama, Cuba, Dominican 
 Republic, Ecuador, Suriname, Uruguay.
La tin America high-income/food importers: Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Chile, 
Peru, Venezuela.
La tin America medium-income: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Colombia, Guyana, Paraguay, Haiti, Plurinational State of Bolivia.
So uth and Southeast Asia high- and medium-income/food exporters: Malaysia, 
the Philippines.
So utheast Asia high- and medium-income/food importers: Republic of Korea, 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Viet Nam, Cambodia.
Asia, low-income: Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka.
Ne ar/Middle East oil exporters: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Islamic Republic of 
Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, Lebanon, Syrian Arab Republic.
Near/Middle East medium- and low-income: Jordan, Yemen, Afghanistan.
Th e rest of world aggregate includes both more and less developed countries. 
Although the aggregate variables are dominated by more developed countries 
in OECD, these countries are not included in the respective broad regional 
aggregates, developed and developing.

